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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
During the past 30 years a lot has happened in the field of LGBT1 rights in Europe. LGBT 
rights have moved from margins of society to an important topic in mainstream political 
and legal discussions, and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender 
identity has secured its place on the list of prohibited grounds alongside, inter alia, race, 
gender and age in a number of international legal instruments. Currently, ten European 
countries allow marriage for both different-sex and same-sex couples and another fifteen 
allow registered partnership. Nevertheless, the question whether same-sex couples should 
have the right to marry, the right to raise children, or even the right to be accepted as 
families remains well-disputed around the Council of Europe member states. 
The developments of LGBT rights in Europe have largely followed a standard sequence: 
decriminalisation, anti-discrimination provisions and finally partnership legislation.2 
However, the pace is uneven and different European countries are in different stages of the 
development process. A rapid evolution is taking place in mostly Western and Northern 
European countries which are one by one inevitably progressing towards full equality 
between different-sex and same-sex families. While in many mainly Eastern European 
countries the parliaments are amending constitutions to define marriage as an institution 
exclusively meant for different-sex couples.3 
A major role in the development that has occurred in Europe has been played by the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ‘the Court’), which monitors the compliance 
with the European Convention on Human Rights (’the Convention’) in the 47 signatory 
states. Since it in 1981 ruled that criminalisation of same-sex sexual activity violates the 
right to private life under the Convention, the Court has been called upon to decide a 
number of issues relating to the daily lives of LGBT persons and families. 
The right to respect for private and family life under article 8 of the Convention has been 
described as the ’powerhouse’ for sexual orientation complaints. Article 8 along with 
                                               
1 Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual and Transsexual 
2 Waaldijk 2000, 62. 
3 ILGA-Europe Rainbow Map (Index) 2013; Itaborahy & Zhu 2013, 30–32. 
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article 14 of the Convention (prohibition on discrimination) have provided a basis for a 
number of successful complaints challenging sexual orientation discrimination under the 
Convention, thereby making the Court essential in bringing about the change in Europe.4  
However, while sexual orientation as ’an important aspect of private life’ and as ’an 
essentially private manifestation of the human personality’ has already quite an established 
protection under the Convention, the ‘family life’ aspect have bee absent in the Court’s 
case law until very recently. It was not until 2010 that the Court finally accepted that same-
sex couples enjoy family life for the purposes of article 8. Subsequently the Court has both 
upheld and dismissed complaints alleging discrimination between same-sex and different-
sex couples, the result being largely dependent on the exact status conferred on same-sex 
couples in the national legislation. Given rapid social changes occurring in Europe, the 
evolving equality standards and growing public acceptance of same-sex families, it is 
unlikely that the Court has had its final say in the matter. 
1.2 Purpose of the study and structure 
In my opinion, we are past the time of discussing whether and why sexual orientation and 
homosexuality deserves protection, or whether homosexuals are as capable of loving 
family relationships and child rearing as heterosexuals.5 Therefore,  this thesis starts from 
the simple premise that homosexuals: 
[…] have the same human capacity as heterosexual and non-transsexual individuals to fall in love 
with another person, or to establish a long-term emotional and physical relationship with them, and 
potentially to want to raise children with them. When they choose to do so, they will often want the 
same opportunities as heterosexual individuals to be treated as a ‘couple’, as ‘spouses’, as ‘partners’, 
as ‘parents’, as a ‘family’.6 
Thus, the purpose of this master’s thesis is to study the Court’s jurisprudence on same-sex 
families and to examine how this need, i.e., their need for legal recognition and protection 
has been met by the Court. 
I have formulated this purpose into two more concrete research questions: 
1) How the Court has recognised and protected same-sex family life and what is the 
current level of protection afforded to them? 
                                               
4 Johnson 2012b, 93. 
5 For further reading on sexual orientation as a human right see: Heinze, 1995; Wintemute 1995. 
6 Wintemute 2005, 191. 
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2) Has the Court been consistent in its case law and is the protection afforded 
satisfactory? 
By examining the present situation and the arguments used by the Court, I shall also try to 
identify the main problems in the Court’s current approach, possible reasons for the current 
situation and to propose some ways forward. 
For the purposes of this thesis, legal recognition of ’same-sex family life’ is essentially the 
same as the concept Wintemute calls as ‘love rights’, that is, ”legal recognition and equal 
treatment of the relationships between LGBT individuals and their partners”.7 It derives 
from the Court’s inclusive concept of ‘family life’ and encompasses both the relationship 
between same-sex partners, as well as the parent-child relationship between same-sex 
parents and their children, without making a distinction whether two adult living together 
as a couple constitutes a ‘family’ or whether the existence of a ‘family’ requires the 
presence of children.8 
Legal recognition of same-sex family life ultimately means equal access to civil marriage. 
It may also mean an ‘alternative registration system’ intended as a substitute for marriage 
which may be equal, almost equal, or substantially inferior to a civil marriage.9 Legal 
recognition may also occur in specific situations when same-sex couples are granted a 
particular  right  or  benefit,  which  previously  were  only  granted  to  different-sex  couples,  
without  granting  same-sex  couples  the  full  right  to  marry  or  contract  a  civil  union.10 
Finally, legally recognising the family tie between a child and a social parent (also 
’second-parent’ or ’co-parent’), who is the same-sex partner of the child’s biological 
mother or father and not biologically related to the child, is a form of legal recognition of 
same-sex family life. 
As to the structure of this thesis, in the first chapter I shall introduce the Court and its main 
interpretation methods and in the second chapter I shall present the relevant articles of the 
Convention and their scope. In the third chapter the Court’s case law on the issue of same-
                                               
7 Wintemute 2005, 191. 
8 Sörgjerd 2012, 14. For the purposes of this thesis the terms ‘same-sex family’ and ‘same-sex couple’ are for 
the most part interchangeable. Usually ‘same-sex family’ is used both as an umbrella term to refer all family 
units comprising a same-sex couple with or without children, and more specifically to refer only to families 
with children. It is always evident from the context when this distinction is important. ‘Same-sex couple’ 
always refers to same-sex partners. 
9 Also terms ‘registered partnership’, ‘civil union’ and ‘civil partnership’ are used interchangeably.  
10 Wintemute 2005, 200–206. 
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sex family life will be analysed. I have allocated the cases thematically under different 
aspects of the legal recognition of same-sex family life.  In some cases this has proven not 
to be very straightforward and same cases may appear under different themes when 
appropriate. In the fourth chapter, I shall shortly look into the limits of the Court’s 
supervision and the Court as a part of European-wide human rights regime. Finally, in the 
last chapter I shall present my findings on the current level of protection afforded to same-
sex family life by the Court. I shall also present some possible explanations for the current 
situation and suggest some ways forward. 
1.3 Method and Materials 
The subject of this thesis belongs with the field of constitutional law, and more precisely 
with the constitutional and human rights law. In addition, the issue at hand is connected to 
several other fields such as family law, international public law, and law and gender.  
The starting point in this thesis is the method of legal dogmatics. The purpose of legal 
dogmatics is to describe and systematise legal sources and legal arguments.11 The choice 
of this method is justified because I shall, through a case law analysis, try to identify and 
systematise what is the current approach of the Court towards same-sex couples’ right to 
respect for family life and right to marry. However, I shall also go beyond the traditional 
legal dogmatics and try to unveil the reasons behind the Court’s current position on same-
sex family life. This specific approach is justifiable because the Court’s case law and its 
methods of interpretation are already quite thoroughly researched and systematised, and 
purely legal dogmatics approach would not bring much new considerations. 
This thesis also has a de lege ferenda aspect, which according to Peczenik means “making 
justified recommendations for the lawgiver”.12 As I shall make some suggestions as how 
the Court could better accommodate the needs of same-sex. 
The Court’s judgments analysed in this thesis have been chosen as follows: I have 
identified the relevant judgments and decision by using the chronological list of all the 
Court’s decisions and judgments relating to homosexuality provided by Paul Johnson.13 
For each case the list provides information, inter alia, on the articles invoked, and the key 
issue  of  the  complaint.  From  the  list  I  have  selected  those  decisions  and  judgments  that  
                                               
11 Peczenik 2005, 11; Hirvonen 2011, 22–23. 
12 Peczenik 2005, 4. 
13 Johnson 2014. 
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concerned same-sex family life such as housing, immigration and adoption, and where at 
least  one  of  the  articles  8,  12  and  14  was  invoked.  I  have  also  included  several  other  
judgments and decisions which I have identified with the help of research literature, 
although not all of these cases concern same-sex family life. For example cases concerning 
transsexuals’ right to marry in their post-operative gender and de facto family life of 
opposite-sex couples have been included as a reference point in order to illustrate the 
Court’s evolving notion of ‘family life’ and ‘marriage’. 
As to the other materials, commentaries to the selected cases and the extensive literature on 
the Convention, the Court and its methods of interpretation constitute the bulk of my 
research literature. In addition, I have used legal literature in the field of family law, LGBT 
rights and human rights in general. Since this thesis also includes some considerations 
mainly over changing attitudes and moral values of the society some sources from other 
disciplines, mostly historical and sociological, have been used. The focus will be on the 
European level and national situation or legislation will be referenced only when it is 
necessary for the understanding of the Court’s case law. Finland is sometimes used as an 
example due to obvious reasons. 
1.4 Some central concepts 
1.4.1 Concepts of marriage and family 
Here, in the end of the introduction chapter, I shall shortly address the problematic behind 
the ’traditional’ concepts of marriage and family.14 It is important to note, however, that in 
the Convention system, these concepts have an autonomous meaning, which can differ 
from what is presented here. The Court’s notion of ‘family life’ will be described in 
chapter 3.1.2. 
Several scholars agree that marriage has never been a fixed institution but a social one that 
derives from the historical, cultural and religious context of the society in which it exists.15 
Therefore, institution and concept of marriage have always changed and evolved over 
time. Consequently, the argument often used by the opponents of same-sex marriage that 
                                               
14 For a more comprehensive study on the changes in the institutions of marriage and family see for example: 
Eskridge 1993, 1447–1453, 1469–1484; Sörgjerd 2012, Nieminen 2013. 
15 Sörgjerd 2012, 3, 6. See also: Utrio 1984, 72–96; Eskridge 1993, 1485, 1494–1497; Waaldijk 2000, 62–
66. 
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allowing same-sex couples to marry would irrevocably change the institution of marriage 
and disconnect it from its tradition and historical background, is flawed.16 
Consider for example the status of women. Until the beginning to mid 20th century, upon 
entering marriage, the wife became the property of her husband. She did not have the right 
to own property, to vote, to sign contracts or the right over her own body. As Mah notes, 
“this was part of the concept of marriage – it was socially acceptable as well as legal”17 
and at the time, the equality between spouses was opposed just as vigorously as same-sex 
marriage is opposed to day, and much with the same arguments.18 Another example is the 
ban on interracial marriage to which the ban on same-sex marriage has been compared. 
Today such a restriction seems archaic, shameful or even bizarre.19 However, when the 
United States Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia in 1967 ruled the ban to be 
unconstitutional, there were laws prohibiting it were still enforce in 17 states.20 
The same plurality applies to the concept of family. Numerous scholars agree that there is 
no such thing as ‘traditional’ family. As Anderson points out: 
There is not, nor ever has there been, a single family system. The West has always been characterised 
by diversity of family forms, by diversity of family functions and by diversity in attitudes to family 
relationships not only over time but at any one point in time. There is, except at the most trivial level, 
no Western family type.21 
Rather there has always been an ideal family form promoted by the state and/or the church, 
often as a means to regulate moral behaviour. However, the ideals have never reflected the 
exiting reality to one hundred percent.22 
Also the ‘traditional’ concept of family is routinely invoked by the opponents of same-sex 
marriage as one of the main arguments for maintaining marriage as a heterosexual 
institution.23 For instance in the Finnish Parliament discussion on Equal Marriage Act, 
biology, religion and the child’s right to both a mother and a father were frequently used to 
                                               
16 See for example: Eskridge 1993, 1423–1434, 1493–1502; Saez 2011, 39–47; Record of the Finnish 
Parliament’s Plenary Session 12/2014. 
17 Mah 2005, 26. 
18 Graff 2000, 47. 
19 Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010), § 112; Johnson 2011, 359. 
20 Loving v. Virginia (1967); Loving Day, Legal Map. See also: Eskridge 1993, 1504–1510. 
21 Anderson 1980/1995, 2. See also Utrio 1984; 208–270; Hareven 1991; Häggman 1996, 15–16. 
22 Häggman 1996, 15–16; Sörgjerd 2012, 8. 
23 See for example in Berthelet 2003, 14; Record of the Finnish Parliament’s Plenary Session 12/2014. 
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legitimate the continuing reference to the traditional concepts.24 In truth, there have always 
been different kinds of families, inter alia, marital, non-marital, single parent, step-parent 
even same-sex families.25 For example, currently ’non-traditional’ families constitute 
almost 40 percent of all families in Finland.26 
The dominant definitions of ‘marriage’ and ‘family’ hold great societal power, because 
they are reflected in all national and international policies and legal instruments governing 
relationships between people. As Hodson aptly summarises: 
The traditional idea of ‘the family’ in Europe is represented by the nuclear family: a married opposite-
sex couple and their children. The notion of the family is an ideal type that retains considerable 
influence in framing national and international laws and policies affecting personal relationships. 
However, it is becoming increasingly distant from the lived reality of very many European families 
and their children.27 
1.4.2 Heteronormativity 
When researching on topics such as equal marriage and same-sex family life, one cannot 
avoid encountering the concept of heteronormativity. Although I have eschewed from 
using it because such analysis would require more profound understanding of the concept 
and  the  theories  behind  it,  than  I  have  had  the  possibility  to  obtain  in  the  course  of  this  
thesis. However, it was frequently used in my research literature and therefore it also 
appears in this thesis. Consequently, I feel that it is necessary to provide an elementary 
explanation of the concept. 
Heteronormativity is a concept used especially in feminist and queer28 theory to describe 
heterosexuality as a norm in our society. In simple terms it is the assumption that everyone 
                                               
24 Record of the Finnish Parliament’s Plenary Session 12/2014. 
25 Utrio 1984, 216–224; Eskridge 1993; Boswell 1994; Waaldijk 2000, 64. 
26 Statistics Finland 2013. Here, ‘family’ only refers to families with children and ‘non-traditional’ families 
to all other family types than married couples with biological children, that is, non-marital families, single-
parent families and same-sex families.  
27 Hodson 2008, 7. 
28 It is impossible to define ‘queer theory’ briefly yet exhaustingly. Merriam-Webster online dictionary 
defines queer theory as ”an approach to literary and cultural study that rejects traditional categories of gender 
and sexuality”. According to ILGA glossary: ”Queer has become an academic term that is inclusive of people 
who are not heterosexual - includes lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and trans. Queer theory is challenging 
heteronormative social norms concerning gender and sexuality, and claims that gender roles are social 
constructions.” 
“Queer theory is interested in exploring the borders of sexual identities, communities, and politics. How do 
categories such as "gay," "lesbian," and "queer" emerge? From what do they differentiate themselves, and 
what kinds of identities do they exclude? How are these borders demarcated, and how can they be contested? 
What are the relations between the naming of sexuality and political organization it adopts, between identity 
and community? Why is a focus on the discursive production of social identities useful? How do we make 
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is heterosexual and that the normal and natural way to live is heterosexual.29 Jackson 
describes it as ”a shorthand for numerous ways in which heterosexual privilege is woven 
into the fabric of social life, pervasively and insidiously ordering everyday existence”.30 
Heteronormativity is not something that just exists, on the contrary, it is constantly 
maintained, mobilised and reproduced in almost ”every aspect of the forms and 
arrangements of social life” such as law, language, commerce, education or conventions 
and narratives of the popular culture,31 i.e., in basically any ”routine activities in which 
gender, sexuality and heterosexuality interconnect”.32 
The maintenance of heterosexual privilege is dependent on the exclusion and 
marginalisation of other sexualities for its legitimacy.33 According to Johnson, law is 
central in this process when heterosexual privilege is sustained by the legal discrimination 
of non-heterosexuals such discrimination being characteristic to the majority of the states 
worldwide. The law is used to exclude non-heterosexuals from civil rights and social 
participation enjoyed by heterosexuals. He argues that: 
Heteronormative law ‘distorts’ lives because it helps to enforce a ‘silence’ in contemporary societies 
about heterosexuality which means that, instead of speaking about heterosexuality as a social and 
political construction and mode of social organization, it is ‘taken for granted’ as a ‘normal’ aspect of 
human life.34 
In the context of equal marriage and the legal recognition of same-sex family life, the key 
dispute lies in ”to what extent the legal protection of ‘traditional’ marriage relies upon the 
discrimination of non-heterosexuals to maintain its social and cultural status”.35 
                                                                                                                                              
sense of the dialectical movement between inside and outside, heterosexuality and homosexuality? […] 
Queer theory recognizes the impossibility of moving outside current conceptions of sexuality. We cannot 
assert ourselves to be entirely outside heterosexuality, nor entirely inside, because each of these terms 
achieves its meaning in relation to the other. What we can do, queer theory suggests, is negotiate these limits. 
We can think about the how of these boundaries – not merely the fact that they exist, but also how they are 
created, regulated, and contested. The emphasis on the production and management of heterosexuality and 
homosexuality characterizes the poststructuralist queer theory project.” Namaste 1994, 224. See also Turner 
2000, 1–35. 
29 Rosenberg 2002, 100. 
30 Jackson 2006, 108. 
31 Berlant & Warner 1998, 554–555. 
32 Jackson 2006, 114. 
33 Jackson 2006, 107. 
34 Johnson 2011, 350–352. 
35 Johnson 2011, 351. 
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2. THE CONVENTION SYSTEM OF PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
2.1 The Court and the Convention - general principles 
The European system under the Convention is unique in international law and is 
considered to be the most effective human rights protection regime in the world.36 It  is  a 
multilateral treaty-based, divided-power system, which has been set up in order to 
guarantee the protection of basic human rights within the contracting states. The 
contracting states have agreed to respect the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the 
Convention and to effectively resolve any violations at the national level. Thus, the Court 
acts as a final remedy, in other words, a safeguard for violations that have not been solved 
at the national level and exercises authoritative supervision over the contracting states as 
the ”ultimate interpreter of the law of the Convention”.37 It  is  compulsory  for  all  the  
contracting states to recognise the right to individual application before the Court as well 
as the binding nature of the Court’s final judgments.38  
The  growing  awareness  of  the  significance  of  the  Court  in  redressing  human  rights  
violations has resulted in an increasing caseload.39 To  ensure  the  future  viability  of  the  
Court, the contracting states prepared the Brighton declaration which, among other things, 
amended the application period from six months to four months after exhausting domestic 
remedies. The Brighton Declaration subsequently led to the new Protocol No. 15 which 
will enter into force as soon as all contracting states have signed and ratified it.40 
The Court’s special position as a supranational human rights court exercising its judicial 
power  over  sovereign  states  gives  rise  to  issues  that  national  supreme  or  constitutional  
                                               
36 Helfer 1993, 133; Ryssdall 1996, 18. 
37 Brighton declaration, § 3; Yourow 1995, 2–4. Prior to 1998 and the entry into force of Protocol No. 11, 
there was also a judicial body called the European Commission of Human Rights. The Commission made all 
admissibility decisions and decided which applications were directed to the Court for further examination of 
the merits. 
38 ECHR articles 34 and 46. 
39 ECtHR 2014b, 3–7. In the end of 2013 there were almost 100 000 applications pending before the Court. 
In 2013 the Court delivered approximately 3600 judgments while almost 90 000 were declared inadmissible 
or struck out. The countries that top the statistics in both pending applications and delivered judgments are: 
Russia,  Turkey,  Romania,  Ukraine,  Italy  and Serbia.  Over  two thirds  of  the  judgments  in  which  the  Court  
found a violation concerned right to fair trial; prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment, and right to 
liberty and security.  
40 Brighton Declaration; Protocol No. 15 was opened for signature in June 2013, as of 18 March 2014 there 
were 29 signatures and 6 ratifications. 
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courts do not encounter. The current forty-seven contracting states comprise a considerable 
cultural and legal diversity: the English common law and the continental civil law, and the 
old liberal democracies in West and the post-socialistic East being just few of the fault 
lines Yourow identifies.41 This makes it often hard to identify a uniform standard of human 
rights in all the contracting states. Therefore, the protection must be gradual, in order to 
maintain the ”fragile foundations of the consent” of contracting states, on which the entire 
legal framework of the Court rests upon.42 
Starting point for the Court’s interpretation of the Convention has been international law 
codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.43 Although the Vienna 
Convention has been seldom cited in its judgments, it is nevertheless a constant source of 
inspiration.44 However, given the ‘special character’ of the Convention, the Court has over 
the years developed a distinctive set of creative interpretation methods of its own.45 
Johnson notes that although the way the Court applies its interpretation methods is often 
subject to criticism for lacking coherence and consistency; they are, on the other hand, an 
important framework through which it strives to sustain judicial consistency and legal 
stability. He agrees that it is important that the Court’s judgements appear to be based on a 
legal principle rather than judicial interest of the judges, in order to warrant a creative 
interpretation of the Convention.46 
In this chapter I shall explain some of the most central interpretation methods used by the 
Court. These interpretation methods have been developed in the Court’s case law and have 
previously not been included in the actual text of the Convention. However, the new 
Protocol No. 15 will add a reference to the principle of subsidiarity and the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation in the preamble of the Convention. 
2.2 Autonomous concept 
The principle of autonomous concept implies that the terms used in relation to the 
Convention have an independent meaning which is not necessarily congruent with the 
meaning in national law. The definition of any concept in national law constitutes only a 
                                               
41 Yourow 1995, 4–5. 
42 Council of Europe 2008. 
43 White & Ovey 2010, 64. 
44 Mowbray 2005, 59 footnote 10. 
45 Mowbray 2005, 59–60; White & Ovey 2010, 64. 
46 Johnson 2012b, 65–67. 
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starting point, but its meaning may transcend what most people in the contracting state 
think or how national officials classify the concept.47 
Using autonomous concepts ensures, first, that the Convention terms have the same 
meaning in all the contracting states, and second, that the contracting states do not try to 
circumvent the Convention by classifying something in a way that escapes the guarantees 
of the Convention.48 This principle first emerged in Engel and Others v. the Netherlands 
(1976) where it was applied to the meaning of ‘criminal charge’ in the Convention context. 
The concepts used in relation to family have an autonomous meaning as well, although the 
principle  has  not  been  explicitly  used  by  the  Court  in  any  of  the  cases  examined  in  this  
thesis.  
2.3 Evolutive interpretation 
The evolutive interpretation was first introduced in Tyrer v. the United Kingdom (1978) 
regarding whether a judicial corporal punishment was degrading treatment prohibited by 
article 3 in the Convention. The Court stated that ”the Convention is a living instrument 
which […] must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”.49 In other words, the 
effective protection of human rights requires that the Convention is interpreted in the 
context of ”democratic European society of today” and not in that of sixty years ago when 
the Convention was drafted.50 The  evolutive  approach  allows  the  Court  to  consider  the  
changing social, cultural, moral and legal context of European societies as well as to 
update its case law with regard to changes that the original drafters of the Convention were 
not able to foresee or conceive.51 The living instrument doctrine is constantly relied by 
both,  the  Court  and  the  applicants,  in  order  to  justify  the  expansion  of  the  scope  of  the  
Convention rights. This doctrine has been of particular importance when it comes to LGBT 
rights under the Convention.52 
The evolutive interpretation is closely linked with the ’object and purpose’ of the 
Convention which derives from the Vienna Convention. The Court stated in Soering v. the 
United Kingdom that: 
                                               
47 Letsas 2007, 43, 46. 
48 Letsas 2007, 40–42; Danelius 2012, 51. 
49 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom (1978), § 31. 
50 Matscher 1993, 68; Yourow 1995, 57. 
51 Yourow 1995, 57; Johnson 2012b, 85; Nieminen, 2013, 124 footnote 225. 
52 See for example Johnson 2012b, 84–88. 
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In interpreting the Convention regard must be had to its special character as a treaty for the collective 
enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus, the object and purpose of the 
Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions 
be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective. In addition, any 
interpretation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed has to be consistent with ’the general spirit of the 
Convention, an instrument designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic 
society’.53 
The evolutive interpretation is also linked to the consensus analysis which is used in order 
to establish the present-day conditions or the current level of fundamental rights protection 
in contracting states.54 The European consensus method will be further explained in 
chapter 2.6. 
2.4 Principle of proportionality 
In order to ensure that the rights laid down in the Convention are not interfered with 
unnecessarily, the Court applies the principle of proportionality. This principle requires 
that there is a ”reasonable relationship between the means and the aim sought to be 
realised”,55 and that there is ”a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of 
the community and the requirement of the protection of the individual’s fundamental 
rights”.56 
The Court relies on the principle of proportionality often in the context of articles 8–11, the 
second paragraph of which expressly allows restrictions upon those rights as long as it is 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ for certain listed public interest purposes. This has 
been interpreted to mean that the restrictions must be ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued’. In some cases the proportionality test has been invoked in determining whether a 
positive obligation has been satisfied. The principle of proportionality is also a part of the 
non-discrimination rule under article 14; for a difference in treatment not to infringe the 
prohibition of discrimination, there has to be a ”reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be pursued”.57 
                                               
53 Soering v. the United Kingdom (1989), § 87. 
54 Mowbray 2005, 61. 
55 James and Others v. the United Kingdom (1986), § 50. 
56 Soering v. the United Kingdom (1989), § 89. 
57 E.B. v. France [GC] (2008), § 91; Harris et al. 2009, 10–11. 
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The Court takes account of a several factors when deciding whether an interference with a 
Convention rights is proportionate. One important factor is to which extent the interference 
restricts the right in question. The Court will consider an interference as disproportionate if 
it impairs the very essence of the right and the justification for the interference cannot be 
proved.58 
2.5 Margin of Appreciation 
The margin of appreciation doctrine is one of the key methods that the Court uses to 
review complaints; it has had a long history in the jurisprudence of the Court since it was 
first explained in Handyside v. the United Kingdom (1976).59 The margin of appreciation 
can be defined as a certain measure of discretion or ’space for manoeuvre’ subject to 
European supervision that the contracting states enjoy when fulfilling their obligations 
under the Convention.60 The doctrine reflects the subsidiary nature of the Convention in 
relation to safeguarding human rights at the national level, and that the domestic 
authorities are in principle better placed to make assessments of the local needs and 
conditions.61 The margin goes ”hand in hand with supervision under the Convention 
system”.62 It is the Court’s role to review the compatibility of decisions taken by national 
authorities with the Convention, having due regard to the State’s margin of appreciation.63 
However, the doctrine also gives the Court “the flexibility needed to avoid damaging 
confrontations between the Court and the Member States and enables the Court to balance 
the sovereignty of Member States with their obligations under the Convention”.64 
Letsas distinguishes between two different ways the doctrine has been used by the Court: 
the ‘substantive’ and the ‘structural’ concept. The substantive concept is used to “address 
the relationship between individual freedoms and collective goals”, whereas the structural 
concept is used to “address the limits or intensity of the review of the European Court of 
Human Rights in view of its status as an international tribunal”.65 The structural concept 
“amounts  to  the  claim  that  the  Court  should  often  defer  to  the  judgment  of  national  
                                               
58 Council of Europe 2008. 
59 Handyside v. the United Kingdom (1976), § 48; Harris et al. 2009, 11; Johnson 2012b, p. 69–70. 
60 Yourow 1995, 13; Harris et al. 2009, 11. 
61 Olsson v. Sweden (No. 2) (1992); Kilkelly 2003, 8; Brighton declaration, § 11. 
62 Brighton declaration, § 11. 
63 Brighton declaration, § 11. 
64 Council of Europe 2008. 
65 Letsas 2007, 80–81. 
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authorities on the basis that the ECHR is an international convention, not a national bill of 
rights”.66  Further, the ideas of subsidiarity and European consensus are often invoked to 
support the structural use of the margin of appreciation doctrine.67 
The substantive concept of the margin of appreciation doctrine, on the other hand, is most 
often relied upon when balancing the rights contained in the first paragraphs of articles 8–
11 against the permissible interferences which may be justified according to the limitation 
clauses found in second paragraphs of those articles.68 In  assessing  whether  or  not  an  
interference to an article 8–11 right is justifiable the Court applies a three-stage test: 1) the 
interference must be in accordance with the law, 2) the interference must pursue one of the 
legitimate aims listed, and 3) the interference must be proportionate, ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ or respond to a ‘pressing social need’. The margin of appreciation is 
most closely linked to the third part of that test, namely the principle of proportionality, 
and it is used in assessing the proportionality of the state’s acts when weighting the 
competing public and individual interest.69 The Court has often stated that when evaluating 
the pressing social need, its necessity, and the extent of the interfering measures, the 
contracting states enjoy “a certain but not unlimited margin of appreciation”, however, the 
power to give the final ruling on whether the limitations are compatible with the 
Convention remains with the Court.70 
The contracting states enjoy a margin of appreciation also in respect to the prohibition of 
discrimination under article 14. The states have discretion in when they assess whether and 
to what extent differences in otherwise similar or comparable situations justify a different 
treatment.71 
The limits of the margin of appreciation differ according to the context it is applied to. 
Sometimes the margin afforded to the competent national authorities is broad and 
sometimes narrow. This depends on the circumstances of each case, the rights at issue or 
on the balancing of competing rights.72 Factors to be taken into account when determining 
the scope of margin of appreciation include: the existence of common approach among the 
                                               
66 Letsas 2007, 81. 
67 Letsas 2007, 81. 
68 White and Ovey 2010, 79. 
69 Letsas 2007, 86; Harris et al. 2009, 12. 
70 Silver v. the United Kingdom (1983), §97; Kilkelly 2003, 7; Van Dijk et al 2006, 341. 
71 Gas and Dubois v. France (2012), § 58. 
72 Kilkelly 2003, 7, 32; White & Ovey 2010, 326. 
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laws of contracting states, the sensitivity of the area being considered and the variety of 
customs, policies and practices throughout contracting states.73 States have been allowed a 
wide margin of appreciation in cases concerning the protection of public morals because 
the  Court  has  found  there  to  be  little  common  ground  between,  or  a  lack  of  ”a  uniform  
conception of morals” in the contracting states.74 The Court frequently states that the 
national authorities are better placed to give an opinion on the exact content of public 
morals in their contracting state.75 Wide margin of appreciation is applicable also, for 
instance, when it comes to general measures of economic and social strategy.76 
On the other hand, where a particularly important element of an individual’s existence or 
identity is in issue, the Court is less likely to afford the contracting state a broad 
discretion.77 For example in Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom the Court held that because 
the applicable criminal law prevented the applicant from enjoying “a most intimate aspect 
of private life”, particularly serious reasons should have been shown before the 
interference would have be accepted as necessary.78 Furthermore, in cases where a 
difference of treatment is based on sex or sexual orientation the margin of appreciation is 
narrow.79 
In many of the cases examined in this thesis, the issues of individual’s identity requiring a 
narrow margin, and public interest or morals clash. The legal recognition of one’s 
emotional family ties is very important element of one’s existence but the claims of legal 
recognition of same-sex family life are often rejected with reference to the public interest 
in protecting the traditional family. No clear rules emerges from the Court’s case law as to 
which right preceded the other, instead the Court performs the balancing on a case-by-case 
basis. 
                                               
73 Kilkelly 2003, 7–8, 32. 
74 Council of Europe 2008. 
75 Handyside v. the United Kingdom (1976), §48; Müller and Others v. Switzerland (1988), § 35; Open Door 
and Dublin Well Woman (1992), § 68; Vo v. France [GC] (2004), § 82; A, B and C v. Ireland [GC] (2010), § 
223. 
76 Gas and Dubois v. France (2012), § 60. 
77 White & Ovey 2010, 327. 
78 Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (1981). The case concerned criminalisation of homosexual conduct. 
White & Ovey 2010, 327. 
79 Vallianatos and Others v. Greece (2013), § 77. 
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2.6 European consensus 
European consensus can be described as a common European approach amongst the 
majority  of  Council  of  Europe  member  states  regarding  certain  values  and  moral  
principles;80 as the existence of similar patterns of practice, regulation and law across the 
member states;81 or as a consensus on the relative importance of the interests at stake and 
as to the best means of protecting them.82 
However, according to Bribosia et al. “the consensus argument is not a strictly legal tool 
but rather the instrument of a judicial policy lead by the Court in a context where it must 
pay attention to the effectiveness of its rulings”.83 Furthermore, Wintemute observes that 
European consensus “serves to anchor the court in legal, political and social reality on the 
ground” compared to UN “human rights law [that] often loses all contact with Earth, and 
floats off into the stratosphere”.84 
European consensus often plays a key role in both determining the extent of the margin of 
appreciation afforded to the contracting states as well as legitimising the evolutive 
interpretation.85 In determining the extent of the state’s margin of appreciation, a lack of 
European consensus usually results in wider margin of appreciation. On the other hand, the 
existence of common European ground will severely limit the state’s margin. 
Consequently, if the respondent state deviates too much from the practice followed in other 
member states, the Court will more likely to found a violation.86 For instance, in 
Handyside the Court stated that: 
[…] it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a uniform European 
conception of morals. The vie taken by their respective laws of the requirements of morals varies from 
time to time and from place to place […] State authorities are in principle in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements […].87 
European consensus may also provide evidence of the evolved European standard, which 
eventually provides a basis for the evolution of Convention standards through the Court’s 
                                               
80 Dzehtsiarou 2009, 10. 
81 Council of Europe 2008. 
82 Dzehtsiarou 2009, 10. 
83 Bribosia et al. 2014, 14. 
84 Wintemute 2010. 
85 Council of Europe 2008; Dzehtsiarou 2011, 1733, 1736. 
86 Yourow 1995, 194; Council of Europe 2008. 
87 Handyside v. the United Kingdom (1976), § 48. 
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case law. The Court frequently uses European consensus as a way to legitimate departure 
from its previous case law; on the other hand, a lack of consensus may prevent a dynamic 
reading of the Convention.88 For instance, in Marckx v. Belgium, the Court used European 
consensus as a basis for evolutive interpretation of the Convention: 
[…] the Court cannot but be struck by the fact that the domestic law of the great majority of the 
member States of the Council of Europe has evolved and is continuing to evolve, in company with the 
relevant international instruments […] there is a clear measure of common ground in this area 
amongst modern societies.89 
Much research has been put into as what exactly constitutes European consensus in the 
Court’s  view  and  how  it  is  measured,  since  it  is  not  always  evident  from  the  Court’s  
judgments.90 Furthermore, a crucial problem with the European consensus standard arises 
in the context of minority rights, such as LGBT rights, because existence of European 
consensus is dependent on the majority opinion.91 
                                               
88 Kovler et al. 2008; Dzehtsiarou 2011, 1736. 
89 Marckx v. Belgium (1979), § 41. 
90 See for example: Helfer 1993, 138–140. 
91 Benvenisti 1999, 847; Letsas 2007, 121. 
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3. THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION 
3.1 Article 8: the right to respect for private life and family life 
The article 8 of the Convention protects the fundamental right to respect for private and 
family life. The essential object of this provision is to prevent any arbitrary interference by 
the public authorities in the private and family sphere of every individual. In addition, a 
positive obligation may arise from this right.92 
Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for [their] private and family life, [their] home and [their] 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the  prevention  of  disorder  or  crime,  for  the  protection  of  heath  or  morals,  or  for  the  
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
When faced with a complaint brought under article 8, the Court will first consider whether 
the right, which an individual complains has been interfered with, is a right actually 
guaranteed by article 8.93 This means that the Court will analyse whether the relationship 
described by the applicant can be characterised as ‘private life’ or ‘family life’ within the 
meaning of article 8(1).94 Once it has been established that the application in fact falls 
within the scope of article 8, the Court will go on to determine whether there has been an 
interference with the right to respect for ‘private life’ or ’family life’ and if that 
interference can be justified with reference to the requirements under article 8(2), namely, 
that the interference was in accordance with law, pursues a legitimate aim listed in the 
paragraph and is necessary in a democratic society.95 In some cases the Court will consider 
whether the state in question had a positive obligation to act to comply with the ‘respect’ 
requirement and whether it failed to act.96 
                                               
92 Kilkelly 2003, 20; Almeida, 1. 
93 Kilkelly 2003, 8. 
94 Almeida, 2. 
95 Kilkelly 2003, 9; Almeida, 2. 
96 Kilkelly 2003, 9; Almeida, 2. 
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3.1.1 Court’s notion of ‘private life’ 
The  focus  of  this  thesis  is  on  the  ‘family  life’  branch  of  article  8  in  the  Court’s  
jurisprudence. However, ‘private life’ and ‘family life’ are two limbs of the same article 
and the Court does not always make a distinction between the two but states that a 
complaint falls within the scope of article 8 in general. Although, the cases analysed in this 
thesis essentially concern the right to family life of same-sex couples, prior to Schalk and 
Kopf v. Austria (2010) all applications concerning same-sex family life were examined 
under the ‘private life’ limb of article 8, because same-sex relationships did not qualify as 
‘family life’ in the Court’s and the Commission’s opinion.97 Accordingly, it is relevant to 
include here some considerations on the Court’s notion of ’private life’. 
‘Private life’ is a broad concept and so far, the Court has declined to give an exhaustive 
definition.98 However, there are many definitions and descriptions to be found in the 
Court’s jurisprudence as well as in literature. One description of ’private life’, for instance, 
can be found in the Pretty case:  
It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person […] It can sometimes embrace aspects 
of an individual’s physical and social identity […] Elements such as, for example, gender 
identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life […] Article 8 also protects a right to 
personal development and the right to establish and develop relationship with other human beings and 
the outside world.99 
A very apt definition, in my opinion, has been given by Jean Rivero:  
Private life is the sphere of each individual life into which no one can intrude without having been 
asked. Freedom of private life is the recognition, to everyone’s benefit, of a zone of activity which is 
one’s own and whose entry one is free to prohibit to anyone.100 
It was established already in X. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (1975) that sexual life 
is an important aspect of one’s private life and that sexual life includes the right to 
establish sexual relationships and thus the choice of affirming and assuming one’s sexual 
identity.101 
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3.1.2 The Court’s notion of ‘family life’ 
The notion of ‘family life’ is an autonomous concept, which means that it must be 
interpreted independently from the national law of the contracting states.102 However, as is 
the case with the notion of ‘private life’, the Court has avoided giving an exhaustive 
definition of the concept; rather, it has taken a case-by-case approach as to determine its 
applicability. This flexible approach allows the Court to take into account different factors 
concerning social, legal and technological developments such as diversity of modern 
family arrangements and the implications of divorce and medical advance across the 
Council of Europe member states, as well as the social and emotional realities of modern 
family ties without being tied by definitions of the family found in national laws. As a 
result, the concept of ‘family life’ has evolved steadily through the lifetime of the 
Convention. However, as a result of the Court’s case-by-case approach, it is not always 
possible to exhaustively distinguish those relationships that constitute a family life and 
those that do no.103 
The general principle to be applied, when deciding on the existence of family life, is 
whether there are close personal ties between the parties.104 The mere existence of a 
biological tie is not enough for the article 8 to be applicable, only sufficiently close factual 
ties amount to family life. The existence of such ties is determined by the nature of the 
family relationship invoked by the applicant.105 The factors to be considered in order to 
examine if the relationship is indeed genuine and has sufficient constancy to create ‘family 
life‘ may include e.g. did the couple live together, the length of the relationship, do they 
have any children and are there any elements of financial or psychological dependency that 
goes beyond normal emotional ties.106 
For married couples and their children as well as for other close family relationships the 
existence of family ties is assumed unless their absence is evident or proven. For other 
relationships the genuineness of the family ties is determined usually by using the above-
mentioned criteria.107 For instance, cohabiting different-sex de facto couples have enjoyed 
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family life in the Court’s jurisprudence for quite long time.108 Also a child born out of such 
a relationship is ipso jure part of that family unit from the moment of the child’s birth.109 A 
child enjoys family with both parents even though they are not in a relationship together 
and only one of the parents is cohabiting with the child.110 However, the right to respect for 
family life does not protect the mere desire to found a family; it presupposes the existence 
of a family or at least the potential relationship between a child and a parent.111 
Same-sex couples and families, on the other hand, were excluded from the scope of 
‘family  life’  until  2010  and  their  relationship  was  only  considered  to  be  a  part  of  their  
‘private life’.112 However, the recent case law of the Court have extended the scope of 
‘family life’ not only to cohabiting same-sex couples, but also in some cases to same-sex 
couples who are not cohabiting for professional and social reasons.113 
Also  other  relationships,  such  as,  children  and  their  grandparents  and  aunts  and  uncles,  
siblings, parents and their children born as a result of extra-marital affair, children and 
adoptive parents, and children and foster parents have been found to constitute family life. 
Once family life has been established it does not come to an end upon divorce or break up. 
Subsequent events such as adoption or expulsion may break the family tie but only in 
exceptional circumstances.114 
On basis of the above considerations the concept of ‘family life’ in the Court’s 
jurisprudence is very diverse and encompasses many different family relationships. There 
are also some other elements that suggests the same, namely, that ”the Court places clear 
emphasis on the social rather than the biological reality of a situation” when determining 
whether family life exists;115 and “[t]he traditional European concepts common to the 
member States of the Council of Europe is not considered decisive; a family composed 
according to a different cultural pattern – e.g. a polygamous family – is equally entitled to 
protection”,116 although it does not constitute an obligation to recognise such unions as 
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formal marriages.117 The  Court  has  also  recently  emphasised  the  necessity  to  take  into  
account the developments in society, civil-status issues and relationships. It has also 
highlighted the fact that there is not just one right way or one right choice when it comes to 
leading one’s family life.118 
3.1.3 Positive obligation under article 8 
In Marckx v. Belgium (1979) the Court introduced the concept of positive obligations in its 
case law: 
[…] the object of the Article [8] is ”essentially” that of protecting the individual against arbitrary 
interference by the public authorities. Nevertheless it does not merely compel the State to abstain from 
such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations 
inherent in an effective ”respect” for family life. This means, amongst other things, that when the 
State determines in its domestic legal system the regime applicable to certain family ties […], it must 
act in a manner calculated to allow those concerned to lead a normal family life.119 
Since then, the Court has held in numerous occasions that there may be a positive 
obligation inherent in the effective respect of the rights protected under article 8. This 
means that contracting states may have to act affirmatively in order to guarantee 
individuals the effective enjoyment of their private and family life.120 For instance, in the 
above-mentioned Marckx case the positive obligation under article 8 required the state 
legally recognise the relationship between an unwed mother and her biological child to 
allow them to lead a normal family life.121 
However, the notion of ‘respect’ is not clear-cut, but the Court will take account of the 
diversity of practices and the varying circumstances of each contracting state. Accordingly, 
the requirements to ensure effective respect for family life may vary considerably from 
case to case.122 In determining whether a positive obligation exists, regard must be had to 
”whether a fair balance has been struck between the general interests of the community 
and the interests of the individual”.123 The difference between the use of a positive 
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obligations approach and the more traditional negative obligations approach is often 
apparent from the Court’s reasoning, but not from its conclusions.124 
3.2 Article 12: the right to marry and to found a family 
Article 12 guarantees the right to marry and to found a family: 
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the 
national laws governing the exercise of this right. 
The right to marry and to found a family is a lex specialis in relation to the right to family 
life in article 8. The applicants who rely on article 12 usually rely on article 8 as well. 
However, when two persons have entered into marriage, interference with their marital life 
constitutes  an  issue  under  article  8  and  not  under  article  12.125 The  article  contains  two  
distinguishable aspects ‘the right to marry’ and ‘the right to found a family’. The Court has 
stated that the second aspect is not a condition of the first and that “the inability of any 
couple to conceive or parent a child cannot be regarded as per se removing their right to 
enjoy the first limb of the provision”.126 
Article  12  does  not  include  a  second  paragraph,  similar  to  that  of  article  8,  which  lays  
down possibilities for restrictions. Nevertheless, in the last part of the article “according to 
the national laws governing the exercise of this right”, the national legislation has been left 
a certain margin for subjecting the exercise of the rights to certain conditions such as the 
regulation of the legal consequences of marriage and laying down provisions concerning 
the resulting family ties.127 The  scope  of  national  law,  however,  is  not  unlimited  and  the  
limitations introduced by national law “must not restrict or reduce the right in such a way 
or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired”.128 The restrictions 
placed on the right by national law must be imposed for a legitimate purpose and must not 
go beyond a reasonable limit to attain that purpose.129 
The Court has interpreted the explicit reference to “men and women of marriageable age” 
to  mean  that  only  two  persons  of  different  sex  has  the  right  to  marry,  although  the  
determination of gender should no longer be limited to purely biological criteria. In this 
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context, the Court has made reference to article 9 of the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Right which also contains ‘a right to marry’ but with different wording: “The 
right to marry and to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national 
laws governing the exercise of these rights.” The deliberate omission of the reference to 
‘men and women’ makes future application to same-sex couples possible, although the 
mention of ‘national laws’ leaves member states some room for discretion.130 
3.3 Article 14 – Prohibition of discrimination 
Article 14 of the Convention provides that: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
Article 14 is not an autonomous provision but has effect only in relation to other 
Convention rights. The application of article 14 does not presuppose or require a violation 
of any of the substantive rights of the Convention but it is not applicable unless the facts of 
the complaint fall within the scope of one or more of the other substantive provisions.131 
When reviewing complaints concerning article 14, the Court employs a four-stage analysis 
to find out whether any difference in treatment amounts to discrimination under the 
Convention.132 First, the Court examines whether the application falls within the scope of 
at least one of the substantive provisions. For article 14 to be applicable, “either the 
opportunity denied or the ground for  the  denial  must  fall  ‘within  the  ambit’  of  the  other  
Convention right”.133 However, if a state has gone beyond its contracted duties and 
introduced additional rights than the minimum required by the Convention, article 14 
prohibits discrimination also in respect to those rights if they relate to any substantive 
provision of the Convention.134 Ultimately determining the scope of Article 14, according 
to Baker, “calls for an open-textured consideration of whether the claimant’s enjoyment of 
a  Convention  right  or  freedom on a  basis  of  equality  with  other  members  of  society  has  
been impaired by a state measure or decision”.135  
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In the second stage of the analysis, the Court considers whether the reason for the alleged 
discrimination is one of the grounds listed in article 14. Even though sexual orientation is 
not explicitly listed in the article, the Court has held that it is, indeed, a ground covered by 
‘other status’ in article 14.136 The Court has even stated that differences based on sexual 
orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification;137 and that 
differences based solely on considerations of sexual orientation are unacceptable under the 
Convention.138 
The third stage of the analysis involves determining whether the applicant is in a relatively 
similar or analogous situation with a class of persons who are treated more favourably.139 
This strives to enable the Court to determine whether the discriminatory treatment is 
attributable to one of prohibited grounds of discrimination under article 14 and not to other 
factors. The situation of the applicant and the comparator must be analogous in all material 
respects in order to properly conclude that the difference in treatment arises from a ground 
prohibited under article 14.140 
The fourth and final stage of the test is analysing whether any difference in treatment by 
public authority had a reasonable and objective justification.141 This means that the 
difference in treatment must pursue ‘a legitimate aim’ or there has to be ”a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised”. Margin of appreciation afforded to the contracting states by the Court plays an 
important role in assessing whether and to what extent differences in treatment in 
otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment.142 For instance, in situations 
where a difference in treatment is based on sex or sexual orientation, the margin of 
appreciation is narrow.143 On the other hand, the margin is usually wide when it comes to 
general measures of economic or social strategy, such as whether the states should provide 
registered partnership for same-sex couples.144 
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3.4 Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 
In addition to article 14, the Convention contains a general prohibition of discrimination in 
the Protocol No. 12 which entered into force in 2005 and currently has18 ratifications.145 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 reads: 
1. The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
2. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those 
mentioned in paragraph 1. 
To date, the Court has issued only one judgment concerning Protocol No. 12,146 and 
considering that less than half of the contracting states have ratified the Protocol, its 
practical effect is still quite little. However, as Wintemute argues, if every state ratified the 
Protocol No. 12, it would supersede article 14 and its requirement that a complaint must 
fall within the scope of one of the substantial provisions.147 In such case the Court would 
be free to examine any differential treatment by a public authority in respect of legal rights 
and decide whether there is an objective and reasonable justification.148 
On the other hand, Johnson thinks that most likely the Protocol No. 12 will not 
dramatically change the situations for applicants complaining on sexual orientation 
discrimination since the Court is already ”willing to engage in a wide reading of the other 
substantive provisions of the Convention and accept that discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation falls within their ambit for the purposes of Article 14”. For example in 
E.B. v. France the Court held that although the Convention does not guarantee a right to 
adopt per se,  if  a contracting state has gone beyond its  Convention duties and decided to 
allow adoption for single persons, it must do so without discrimination based on, among 
others, sexual orientation.149 According to Johnson, the Protocol No. 12 is important only 
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insofar it puts beyond any doubt the principle that sexual minorities must not be 
discriminated against in the enjoyment of any right set forth in law.150 
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4. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX FAMILY LIFE 
4.1 Acknowledging same-sex ’family life’ 
As Sörgjerd observes, the distinction between private life and family life is essential for the 
level of protection guaranteed by the Convention, the ‘family life’ limb offering more 
extensive protection. It includes, inter alia, a right for family members to live together, an 
obligation for the national legislator to protect the family in national family laws, and to 
guarantee the same social benefits to same-sex couples as those applicable to unmarried 
cohabiting different-sex couples.151 On the other hand, Nieminen suggests that the Court 
has in fact already recognised a pluralistic family model by protecting same-sex families 
through the ‘private life’ limb of article 8, which would have made it possible to maintain a 
more traditionalistic approach to the ‘family life’ limb.152 
In any case, the Court’s acknowledgement that same-sex couples enjoy ‘family life’ for the 
purposes of article 8, is a prerequisite for the future extension of positive obligation to 
require the legal recognition of same-sex family life. 
The need for recognition of same-sex relationships as ‘family life’, or at least as being in a 
comparable situation with different-sex couples, first emerged in several complaints 
concerning the immigration regime of the United Kingdom in the 1980s. Common to these 
complaints  was  that  the  first  applicant,  who  was  being  deported,  was  in  a  same-sex  
relationship with the second applicant who was a UK citizen.153 The UK immigration rules 
did not recognise any form of same-sex relationship as a basis for granting a residence 
permit to an alien, whereas different-sex marriage or engagement formed a basis for 
staying in the United Kingdom.154 The Commission found all these applications manifestly 
ill-founded and therefore inadmissible. Usually, it did not give any explanation as to why it 
came to this conclusion. For example in one of the first cases, X and Y v. the United 
Kingdom (1983),  the  Commission  simply  stated  that  “despite  the  modern  evolution  of  
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attitudes towards homosexuality […] the applicants’ relationship does not fall within the 
scope of the right to respect for family life”. 155 
The Commission’s statement in the decision S v. the United Kingdom (1986) which 
concerned succession to a tenancy, summarises its approach to same-sex family life: 
[…] the family (to which the relationship of heterosexual unmarried couples living together as 
husband and wife can be assimilated) merits special protection in society and it sees no reason why a 
High Contracting Party should not afford particular assistance to families. The Commission therefore 
accepts that the difference in treatment between the applicant and somebody in the same position 
whose partner had been of the opposite sex can be objectively and reasonably justified.156 
The Commission distinguished between traditional established families, i.e., heterosexual 
families and other established relationships such as homosexual partnerships that did not 
fall within the definition of ‘family life.157 In Kerkhoven and Others v. the Netherlands 
(1992), a case that concerned second-parent adoption of a child born through artificial 
insemination by donor (AID), the Commission stated that “as regards parental authority 
over a child, a homosexual couple cannot be equated to a man and a woman living 
together”.158 
The judgment X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom (1997) suggests that the same-sex 
relationship seems to have been the main obstacle for ‘family life’. In that case the 
applicants were X, a female-to-male transsexual, his female partner Y and Y’s biological 
daughter born through AID. X and Y had applied for AID together and had gone through 
the treatment as a couple. However, because the United Kingdom legislation at the time 
did not allow transsexual persons to register their post-operative gender, Y remained 
female for legal purposes; therefore he could not be registered as the child’s father. 
Although not finding a violation the Court, nevertheless, concluded that ’family life’ 
existed between the applicants because X lived in society as a man and to all appearance as 
Y’s male partner. Therefore, their situation was “indistinguishable from the traditional 
notion of family life”.159 
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The decision Mata Estevez v. Spain (2001) was the first same-sex family life complaint 
that the Court itself found inadmissible according the new rules under Protocol No. 11. 
The case concerned ineligibility of a homosexual partner to a survivor’s pension. However, 
the Court followed the Commission’s example and stated that the same-sex relationship 
did not fall within the scope of ‘family life’ under article 8. The reasons were that ”despite 
the growing tendency in a number of European States towards the legal and judicial 
recognition of stable de facto partnership between homosexuals, this is, given the existence 
of little common ground between the Contracting States, an area in which they still enjoy a 
wide margin of appreciation”.160 
Throughout the 2000s the Court insisted that intimate same-sex relationship did not 
constitute ’family life’ but only ’private life’. However, the Court did not leave same-sex 
couples totally without protection. In both Karner v. Austria (2003) and Kozak v. Poland 
(2010) the Court upheld the applicants’ complaint concerning their inability to succeed to a 
tenancy previously held by their deceased same-sex partner. In these cases the Court 
deliberately circumvented the question about ‘private life’ and ’family life’ and stated that 
the complaint concerned the applicants’ right to respect for their home.161 
Finally, in the judgment Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (2010), the Court noted that: 
[A] rapid evolution of social attitudes towards same-sex couples has taken place in many member 
States. Since then a considerable number of member States have afforded legal recognition to same-
sex  couples.  Certain  provisions  of  EU  law  also  reflect  a  growing  tendency  to  include  same-sex  
couples in the notion of ‘family’. In view of this evolution the Court considers it artificial to maintain 
the view that in contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy ’family life’ for the 
purposes of Article 8. Consequently, the relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting same-sex couple 
living in a stable de facto partnership falls within the notion of ’family life’, just as the relationship of 
a different-sex couple in the same situation would.162 
After Schalk and Kopf the question whether same-sex couples can enjoy family life for the 
purposes of the Convention has no longer been a contested issue but a statement of fact.163 
Although the acceptance of ‘family life’ may seem trivial, especially since the Court still 
did not find a violation in Schalk and Kopf,  the  Court’s  statement  is  nonetheless  an  
important one. It opened whole new doors for the promotion of same-sex family rights. It 
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is  a  long  term principle  of  the  Court  that  the  right  to  respect  for  family  life  gives  rise  to  
positive obligation for the state to take positive action to guarantee the effective enjoyment 
of the right to family life through legal recognition. By accepting that a same-sex 
relationship constitutes ‘family life’ the Court has paved way for the possible future 
expansion  of  the  scope  of  positive  obligations  under  article  8  to  cover  the  obligation  to  
legally recognise same-sex family life by providing access to a partnership institution. 
4.2 Legal recognition through marriage or registered partnership legislation 
The core issue in the discrimination against same-sex couples and same-sex families is the 
lack of legal recognition for their family life through marriage or similar institution such as 
civil partnership. If convention states were required to allow same-sex marriage or provide 
similar protection through civil partnership legislation, this would remedy most of the 
differential treatment same-sex couples now complain to the Court. 
The Court frequently refers to the traditional concept of marriage and its ”deep rooted 
social and cultural connotations”164 to justify the special status of marriage in European 
societies and in its own jurisprudence. However, by examining the Court’s case law in the 
matter, it is clear that ‘marriage’ has not been a static concept. Therefore I shall first 
examine how the concept of marriage have emerged in the Court in respect of divorce and 
transsexuals’ right to marry before examining how the applications claiming the right to 
same-sex marriage and civil partnerships have been addressed by the Court. 
4.2.1 Right to divorce 
In Johnston and Others v. Ireland (1986) the applicants were a cohabiting different-sex 
couple and their daughter. The parents were unable to marry because the Irish constitution 
prohibited divorce and the father was already married but separated from his legal wife. 
This situation further affected their daughter’s rights. As a result of her ‘illegitimate’ 
status, she suffered numerous disadvantages such as being unable to inherit her father; she 
could not have been legitimated even by her parents’ subsequent marriage. The applicants 
alleged that the Irish law violated their rights under articles 8, 12 and 14.165 
The Court rejected the applicant’s claims as regards to article 12 and stated that the right to 
divorce cannot be derived from that article. In order to come to this conclusion, the Court 
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referred to the ordinary meaning of the words ‘right to marry’, which covers the formation 
of marital relationships but not their dissolution. This interpretation, in the Court’s opinion, 
was consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention and its travaux 
préparatoires, which showed that the drafters had deliberately deleted the words pertaining 
to marriage dissolution compared to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, on which the article 12 was based on.166 
In this respect, it is important to note that such deliberate omission had not hindered the 
Court before. In a case that concerned freedom of association (article 11) in 1981, the 
Court reached an exact opposite conclusion. The negative freedom of association, i.e., the 
right not to join (in that case) a trade union, was likewise, according to the travaux 
préparatoires, deliberately left out of the Convention but was included in the UN 
Declaration. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the freedom of association also included a 
negative freedom of association, at least to some extent, because if article 11 was read as 
permitting every kind of compulsion to join a trade union, it would interfere with the very 
substance of the right.167 To nominally distinguish the Johnston case from that one, the 
Court  stated  that  ”in  a  society  adhering  to  the  principle  of  monogamy,  [prohibition  on  
divorce] can [not] be regarded as injuring the substance of the right [to marry]”.168 
As regards the applicants’ article 8 complaint, the Court found them to be a family for the 
purposes of that article despite the fact that their relationship existed outside of marriage. 
However,  the  positive  obligation  under  article  8  did  not  extent  so  far  as  to  require  the  
respondent state to introduce measures permitting divorce and re-marriage.169 
When it came to the rights of the child, the Court followed its precedent in Marckx and 
ruled that the ‘illegitimate’ daughter should be placed, legally and socially, in a position 
akin to that of a ‘legitimate’ child. Here the European consensus and margin of 
appreciation worked in the applicant’s favour: the existence of European consensus in the 
matter being established already in Marckx judgement.  As  regards  to  the  margin  of  
appreciation, despite it being wide in the area in question ”the absence of an appropriate 
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legal regime reflecting the third applicant’s natural family ties amounts to a failure to 
respect her family life”.170 
Dillon strongly criticises the outcome of the Johnston and Others. According to her, there 
would have been plenty of reasons for the Court  to find a violation also in respect of the 
parents’ situation. Non-marital couples were considerably discriminated against in Irish 
statutory law: among others, the summary remedies for domestic violence did not apply to 
non-marital family, and non-marital family did not enjoy the same benefits under the social 
welfare system.171 According to Dillon, the Irish constitutional prohibition of divorce had 
failed to prevent marital breakdown and the formation of ’non-traditional families’ and she 
further argued that allowing divorce and remarriage would have remedied most of the 
problems and stigmatisation unmarried couples and their children suffered. Even the 
European consensus, which was totally absent from the Court’s reasoning regarding 
divorce, was in the applicants’ favour: Ireland was the only major Western European 
country that maintained its ban on divorce.172 
The most probable reason why the Court did not find a violation of article 12, is that there 
had earlier that year been a national referendum to amend the constitution to allow divorce 
but the amendment had been rejected by majority. It has been proposed that after such a 
referendum it was impossible for the Court, as a supranational institution, to go against the 
will of the democratic majority despite the fact that European consensus would have 
supported the finding of a violation.173 Borrowing from Salzberg’s analysis in Marckx, the 
Court clearly could not afford to be judicially active in the Johnston case where it meant 
declaring the Irish constitution incompatible with the Convention.174 
4.2.2 Transsexuals’ right to marry 
Prior to the landmark judgment in Christine Goodwin in 2002, the Court had examined 
three similar cases concerning the legal recognition of gender reassignment: Rees (1986), 
Cossey (1990) and Sheffield and Horsham (1998), all against the United Kingdom. All four 
cases concerned the refusal by the United Kingdom to legally recognise a post-operative 
transsexual’s new gender identity and among other things, the right to marry someone of 
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their present opposite-sex. For instance, Ms. Goodwin who was a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual could not marry a man because she still remained legally male. 
It is interesting for the purposes of this thesis, how the Court’s position on transsexuals’ 
right to marry in their new gender changed from Rees to Christine Goodwin. In Rees the 
Court merely stated that the right to marry in article 12 ”refers to the traditional marriage 
between persons of opposite biological sex [and] is mainly concerned to protect marriage 
as a basis of the family”. In the Court’s opinion, the legal impediment of transsexual 
persons  to  marry  in  their  new  gender  did  not  impair  the  very  essence  of  the  right  to  
marry.175 
In Cossey, the Court already reflected upon the European consensus, evolutive 
interpretation and the margin of appreciation doctrine: 
Although some Contracting States would now regard as valid a marriage between a person in Miss 
Cossey’s situation and a man, the developments which have occurred to date cannot be said to 
evidence any general abandonment of the traditional concept of marriage. In these circumstances, the 
Court does not consider that it is open to it to take a new approach to the interpretation of article 12 on 
the point at issue. It finds, furthermore, that attachment to the traditional concept of marriage provides 
sufficient reason for the continued adoption of biological criteria for determining a person’s sex for 
the purposes of marriage, this being a matter encompassed within the power of the Contracting States 
to regulate by national law the exercise of the right to marry.176 
The Court reviewed the situation once more in 2002 in Christine Goodwin v. the United 
Kingdom, this time finding a violation of both articles 8 and 12. For the first time the Court 
departed from the traditional concept of marriage between persons of opposite sex and the 
interdependence between the ’right to marry’ and the ’right to found a family’ in article 12, 
and observed that the latter was not a precondition of the former. Therefore, ”the inability 
of  any  couple  to  conceive  or  parent  a  child  cannot  be  regarded  as  per  se  removing  their  
right to enjoy” the right to marry.  The Court  also put significant weight on the evolutive 
interpretation and found that the terms ‘man’ and ‘woman’ in article 12 must no longer 
always refer to a determination of gender by purely biological criteria, considering that 
there had been major social changes in the institution of marriage since the adoption of the 
Convention as well as dramatic changes brought by about developments in medicine and 
science  in  the  field  of  transsexuality.  The  Court  also  noted,  that  in  the  article  9  of  the  
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European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, adopted in 7 December 2000, the 
reference to a man and a woman had been deliberately removed.177 
In the present day conditions it was artificial to assert that post-operative transsexuals had 
not been deprived of the very essence of their right to marry: ”The applicant […] lives as a 
woman, is in a relationship with a man and would only wish to marry a man. She has no 
possibility  of  doing  so.”  No  longer  could  the  respondent  state  resort  to  its  margin  of  
appreciation, because it appeared to the Court that the domestic courts, to which the matter 
according to the respondent government should be left, ”tend to view that the matter is best 
handled by the legislature, while the Government have no present intention to introduce 
legislation”.178 
Even the European consensus, which often is an important reason why the Court affords 
wide margin of appreciation for the respondent state, was in the applicant’s favour. The 
Court went so far as to attach ”less importance to the lack of evidence of a common 
European approach […] than to the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing 
international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of 
legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals”.179 Although, 
the Court noted that ”fewer countries permit the marriage of transsexuals in their assigned 
gender than recognise the change of gender itself”, it would have been very inconsistent if 
the Court had found that recognition of transsexual’s post-operative gender did not require 
allowing them to marry in their new gender. Therefore, the margin of appreciation did not 
extent so far as to leave the question of marriage of transsexuals entirely to the contracting 
states.  That  would  have  been  ”tantamount  to  finding  that  the  range  of  options  open  to  a  
Contracting State included an effective bar on any exercise of the right to marry.”180 
The Christine Goodwin judgment is also important from the same-sex marriage point of 
view. It paved the way for a less rigid concept of marriage and the significance of self-
determination as part of human rights protection.  
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4.2.3 Same-sex marriage 
In Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (2010) the applicants challenged the Austrian law that 
limited  the  capacity  to  marry  to  two persons  of  the  opposite  sex.  The  applicants  brought  
their claim under article 12 and article 14 taken in conjunction with article 8. They argued 
firstly, that article 12 should be read in the present-day conditions as obliging member 
states to grant same-sex couples access to marriage, and secondly, that excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage and the absence of any other form of legal recognition constituted 
discrimination contrary to the Convention.181 By the time the Court heard the case, Austria 
had passed the Registered Partnership Act, which came into force in January 2010. There 
were however, a number of differences between marriage and registered partnership 
legislation mainly concerning parental rights, and it was because of these difference that 
the Court refused an application from the Austrian government to struck the case from the 
Court’s list.182 
The Court rejected the applicants’ argument that the Convention, being a living instrument, 
should be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions in their case. Once again, it 
resorted to the drafters intention interpretation and explained that the choice of wording in 
article 12 (’men and women’ instead of ‘everyone’ or ’no one’) and the historical context 
clearly indicate that the right to marry in article 12 refers to marriage in the traditional 
sense of being a union between partners of opposite sex.183 However the Court also 
rejected that article 12 was inapplicable in all circumstances to same-sex couples and 
thereby opened up discussion about the scope of contracting states’ obligations under it. 
Nevertheless, it preferred to leave the matter to contracting states because of the lack of 
European consensus and the ”deep-rooted social and cultural connotations” the marriage 
has, thereby warranting a wide margin of appreciation.184 
As regards to the issue under articles 14 and 8, as already mentioned in chapter 4.1, the 
Court took a remarkable step forward and chose to depart from its earlier case law on 
same-sex couples and their incapability of enjoying ‘family life’.185 However, the Court’s 
judgment falls short when it comes to the positive obligation under article 8 that require the 
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state to establish a legal framework that enables the normal enjoyment of family life and 
the development of family ties. The Court followed the article 14 test until its third stage 
and found a same-sex couple to be in relevantly similar situation compared to a different-
sex couple ”as regards their need for legal recognition and protection of their relationship”. 
The Court even recalled that ”differences based on sexual orientation require particularly 
serious reasons”.186 However, instead of requiring the respondent state to provide any 
justification for the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, the Court simply 
referred to its conclusion under article 12. It stated, inter alia, that the Convention should 
be read as a whole and article 8 having more general purpose and scope than article 12, 
could not be interpreted as to impose an obligation on the contracting states to grant same-
sex couples access to marriage.187 
Because of the Registered Partnership Act had been passed in Austria just prior to the 
judgment in Schalk and Kopf, the Court was ”not called upon to examine whether the lack 
of any means of legal recognition for same-sex couples would constitute a violation” of 
articles 14 and 8. It had also been within Austria’s margin of appreciation to not to provide 
legal recognition for same-sex couples any sooner that it had, as is the exact status of such 
”alternative means of recognition”.188 
The Court distinguished Schalk and Kopf from Christine Goodwin on  two  accounts,  in  
order to explain why the principles established in the Goodwin case did not apply to same-
sex marriage. Firstly, there was no European consensus regarding same-sex marriage.189 
However, in the Goodwin case the Court circumvented ”the lack of evidence of a common 
European approach” by referring to ”the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing 
international trend”. Why was this not possible in Schalk and Kopf? There seems to be a 
somewhat clear international trend towards acceptance of same-sex marriage as well.190 
Secondly, the Goodwin case concerned marriage between partners of different genders, 
and it therefore fell within the heteronormative conception of marriage and accordingly, as 
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Bamforth notes, there was no need ”for more radical attempts to reconceptualise or move 
beyond ‘conventional’ notions of ‘male’ and ‘female’ when interpreting the Article”.191 
The judgment in Schalk and Kopf has attracted much criticism. Hodson sees it as falling 
short  of  the  equal  protection  the  Convention  promises  to  everybody  regardless  of,  inter 
alia, his or her sexual orientation. This creates a situation ”in which a Convention right is 
currently enjoyed by a particular category of persons only with the say-so of the States 
themselves”. She further states that it is highly inadequate for a human rights tribunal of 
the  Court’s  status  ”to  look  for  State  consensus  when  faced  with  a  situation  of  
acknowledged discrimination”, when the respondent state was not even asked to give any 
cogent reasons for discriminatory treatment. Consequently, the applicants’ complaint was 
”not accorded the high-level of scrutiny that the Court has promised those complaining of 
sexual-orientation discrimination”.192 
As the main reason for the outcome in Schalk and Kopf,  Hodson sees  the  still  prevalent  
prejudices against homosexuality. She argues that the Court used the reference to drafters’ 
intention not as an absolute relapse to more conservative interpretation methods, but as a 
”smokescreen through which to conceal present day prejudice”. She continues: ”[i]t is the 
current struggle that Europe still faces to overcome preconceived ideas about marriage and 
the  family  to  the  exclusion  of  same-sex  couples  that  is  the  real  story  in  Schalk and 
Kopf”.193 
Johnson provides a very comprehensive analysis of the case arguing how the Court 
reiterates a heteronormative understanding of marriage and declines to engage in a critical 
consideration on how ”ideas of gender difference are used to justify the preservation of the 
heteronormative social construction of marriage”. In doing so ”the Court has played a 
performative role in (re)constructing the heteronormative ‘tradition’ of marriage’”.194 The 
higher courts in other jurisdictions have adopted totally different approach and found the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage to be unconstitutional and 
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to violate basic human rights. They have even compared the marriage restriction based on 
gender to marriage restrictions based on race.195 
The Court has later, in Gas and Dubois v. France and X and Others v. Austria 
unanimously confirmed its view that: 
Article 12 does not impose an obligation on the Contracting States to grant same-sex couples access to 
marriage. Nor can a right to same-sex marriage be derived from Article 14 taken in conjunction with 
Article 8. Where a State chooses to provide same-sex couples with an alternative means of legal 
recognition, it enjoys a certain margin of appreciation as regards the exact status conferred. 
Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly held that marriage confers a special status on those who enter 
into it. The exercise of the right to marry is protected by Article 12 of the Convention and gives rise to 
social, personal and legal consequences.196 
In the Court’s view same-sex couples are not discriminated against when they are denied 
legal rights available to married couples. Johnson sees this unanimous statement as a ”clear 
sign that the Court intends no evolution in its case law on same-sex marriage in the near 
future”. He argues that using the margin of appreciation to allow the contracting states to 
”maintain the heterosexual exclusivity of marriage [the Court] perpetuates a wide range of 
discrimination suffered” by same-sex families who cannot complain under article 14 about 
discrimination, that results from ”being outside the ‘special status’ of marriage because 
such exclusion is permitted” under article 12. Since same-sex marriage is not allowed in 
the majority of contracting states, the Court essentially allows them to maintain forms of 
discrimination based solely on the grounds of sexual orientation.197 
4.2.4 Same-sex civil partnerships 
In Vallianatos and Others v. Greece (2013) several same-sex couples complained on the 
blanket exclusion of same-sex couples from the new civil union legislation passed in 
Greece. The law that entered into force in 2008 made provisions for an official form of 
partnership called ‘civil unions’ which was distinct from marriage and could only be 
entered by different-sex couples. The applicants brought their claims under article 14 taken 
in conjunction with article 8. The Greek government argued, inter alia, that the civil union 
law aimed to regulate the existing social phenomenon of unmarried different-sex couples 
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with children so that parent-child relationship would be legally protected even when the 
parents did not want to marry. However, civil unions were also accessible for different-sex 
couples without children.198 
In determining the applicability of article 8, the Court took a small but significant step 
forward in its jurisprudence. It found that as to the scope of ‘family life’, there was no 
basis in distinguishing between cohabiting same-sex couples and same-sex couples who 
did  not  live  together  for  professional  and  social  reasons,  thereby  expanding  the  scope  of  
‘family life’ from what was the situation in Schalk and Kopf.199 
Although Vallianatos and Others is a very important judgment as regards to the right to 
legal recognition of same-sex couples, the Court was very clear that it was only ruling on 
the specific situation when a state has already introduced a civil union legislation which 
excludes same-sex couples from its scope. Therefore it was not concerned with whether 
there was a general obligation to a convention state to provide a form of legal recognition 
in its domestic law.200 
The Court applied its common article 14 test in order to approach the issue complained. 
The Court found that because ”same-sex couples are just as capable as different-sex 
couples of entering into stable committed relationships”, the applicants were in a 
comparable situation to a different-sex couple ”as regards their need for legal recognition 
and protection of their relationship”.201 Also, the Court noted that ”where a difference in 
treatment is based on […] sexual orientation the State’s margin of appreciation is narrow” 
and that ”differences based solely on considerations of sexual orientation are unacceptable 
under the Convention”.202 
As regards to the final stage of article 14 test, namely whether there had been objective and 
reasonable justification for the differential treatment, the Court concentrated on the reasons 
advanced by the government for excluding same-sex couples from the scope of the new 
law. Firstly, the government argued that the rights and obligations created by the civil 
union (relating to property status, the financial relations within each couple and their 
inheritance rights) could also be accessed by same-sex couples on a contractual basis under 
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ordinary law. The Court rejected this argument by stating that the government’s argument 
did not take account on the fact that a civil union as an officially recognised alternative to a 
marriage would have an ”intrinsic value for the applicants irrespective of the legal effects, 
however narrow or extensive that they would produce”.203 The Court further observed that: 
Same-sex couples sharing their lives have the same needs in terms of mutual support and assistance as 
different-sex couples. Accordingly, the option of entering into a civil union would afford the former 
the only opportunity available for them under Greek law of formalising their relationship by 
conferring on it a legal status recognised by the State. […] extending civil unions to same-sex couples 
would allow the latter to regulate issues concerning property, maintenance and inheritance not as 
private individuals entering into contracts under the ordinary law but on the basis of the legal rules 
governing civil unions, thus having their relationship officially recognised by the State.204 
The Court thereby acknowledged the importance of legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships, even when it ultimately is just a matter of symbolic recognition and the same 
legal effects could be achieved by other means as well.205 
The second reason advanced by the government was that the civil union legislation was 
designed to achieve several goals such as protecting children born outside marriage, 
responding  to  the  wishes  of  parents  to  raise  their  children  being  obliged  to  marry,  and  
ultimately strengthening the institution of marriage and the family in the traditional sense. 
The Court reiterated its well-established position that the protection of the family in the 
traditional  sense,  as  well  as,  the  protection  of  the  interests  of  children  are  weighty  and  
legitimate reasons.206 However, it also observed that since the Convention is a living 
instrument: 
The State in its choice of means designed to protect the family and secure respect for family life as 
required by Article 8, must necessarily take into account developments in society and changes in the 
perception of social and civil status issues and relationships, including the fact that there is not jus one 
way or one choice when it comes to leading one’s family or private life.207 
The Court observed that despite the government’s declared intentions of the civil union 
law, it was evident that its provisions were not confined to regulating the status of children 
born outside of marriage. The law clearly introduced a new form of non-marital 
partnership, a civil union, which excluded same-sex couples while being applicable to 
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different-sex couples with or without children. Therefore, the government in focusing its 
arguments  on  the  situation  of  different-sex  couples  with  children  failed  to  justify  the  
difference in treatment arising out of the legislation between same-sex and different sex 
couples who are not parents. The Court further stated that it had not been necessary to 
exclude same-sex couples from civil unions in order to pursue the legitimate aim of 
protecting children: ”It would not have been impossible for the legislature to include some 
provisions dealing specifically with children born outside marriage, while at the same time 
extending to same-sex couples the general possibility of entering into a civil union”.208 
Finally, the Court noted that currently seventeen convention states recognise some form of 
civil partnership for same-sex couples, in addition two countries, Greece and Lithuania, 
authorise civil partnerships exclusively to different-sex couples. Consequently, the Court 
observed the emergence of a clear trend that when the convention states decide to provide 
a form of registered partnership as an alternative to marriage for unmarried couples, they 
include same-sex couples in its scope.209 However, Johnson point out a problem behind 
this  consensus  analysis.  According  to  him,  the  Court  seems  to  suggest  that  ”there  is  a  
‘trend’ in Europe for introducing legislation to make available to all unmarried couples an 
alternative system of registered partnership and that Greece and Lithuania are out of step 
with this”. When in fact, probably most of these states aimed to create a system of 
partnership regulation for same-sex couples which is not marriage.210 
Vallianatos and Others is an important judgment and represents yet another small step 
forward for rights of same-sex families. However, it is only applicable to the specific 
situation where a state decides to or has already set up a civil partnership as an alternative 
to marriage, as a result of this judgment they must now include same-sex couples under its 
scope. The judgment falls short in dealing with the lack of same-sex partnership rights in 
contracting states in general.211 
4.2.5 Cases currently pending at the Court 
Several cases concerning the legal recognition of same-sex partnership are currently 
pending at the Court. 
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Hämäläinen v. Finland (previously H. v. Finland) concerns a transgender woman who 
cannot get her post-operative gender officially recognised because she and her wife refuse 
to divorce and nor do they want to transfer their marriage into a registered partnership. The 
Fourth section of the Court found no violation of any Convention rights and the case was 
subsequently referred to Grand Chamber which held a hearing in October 2013.212 The 
Grand Chamber judgment will be important also from the same-sex marriage point of 
view, although the applicant has been very clear to distance her case from same-sex 
marriage. 
In Chapin and Charpentier v. France the applicants are two men and their marriage 
conducted by a local mayor and which was subsequently declared void by the national 
courts. The applicants brought they claims under article 14 taken in conjunction with 
article 12 and in conjunction with article 8. The case was communicated already in April 
2009.213 Given that France authorised same-sex marriage in 2013, it is probable that the 
Court  will  struck  this  case  out  of  its  list,  since  the  French  law  affords  same  rights  to  
married same-sex couples as to married different-sex couples except for the access to 
assisted reproduction services. It is, however, unlikely that the Court will address this 
difference since it is not at issue in this specific case. 
There are two cases pending against Italy both of which were communicated to the Italian 
government in December 2013. The first, Orlandi and Others v. Italy, is a complaint from 
six couples who have contracted same-sex marriage abroad and who complain on the 
refusal  of  Italian  authorities  to  register  these  marriages.  They  also  raise  the  issue  of  the  
inability to have any other legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the Italian legal 
order. They invoked articles 8, 12 and 14.214 The second case, Oliari and Others v. Italy 
concerns the inability of same-sex couples to contract marriage or any other type of civil 
union in Italy. The applicants have invoked articles 8 and 14.215 As Italy does not currently 
recognise any rights for same-sex couples, it would be very important that the Court should 
have a change to decide on the question of whether the contracting states should offer any 
form  of  legal  recognition  to  same-sex  couples.  Also,  Italy  is  clearly  behind  in  the  
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development of same-sex family rights; it is the only major Western European country that 
does not offer any kind of legal recognition to same-sex couples. 
Ferguson and Others v. the United Kingdom is a joint application from four different-sex 
and four same-sex couples. The application was lodged with the Court on 2 February 2011 
and has not yet been communicated to the United Kingdom government. The applicants 
argue that separate legal provisions for the registration of different-sex and same-sex 
partners is discriminatory and violates article 14 taken in conjunction with article 12. This 
is a different approach than in Schalk and Kopf where the applicants complained under 
article 14 taken in conjunction with article 8 and article 12 alone. This strategy is 
”designed to encourage the Court to consider whether excluding same-sex couples from an 
opportunity that is provided to the majority under article 12 amount to discrimination 
under article 14”.216 The application, written by Professor Robert Wintemute, contains 
some very interesting argumentation and comparative case law. However, since the United 
Kingdom have now authorised same-sex marriages, this application will most likely to be 
struck out from the Court’s list.217 
4.3 Parent-child relationship 
4.3.1 Same-sex couples and parenting 
One important aspect of the legal recognition of same-sex family life is the legal 
recognition of parent-child relationships. According to the FRA’s EU LGBT survey, 10% 
of households headed by a same-sex couple had children living in their household; in the 
individual EU member states the figures ranged between 7–15%.218 Also a study 
conducted by the Council of Europe notes that many LGBT persons in Council of Europe 
member states raise children whether alone or with their partner, some of them may have 
brought children from previous heterosexual relationships to the partnership, and some of 
them have adopted children, or accessed services for medically assisted reproduction.219 
The Committee of Ministers has recommended that the child’s best interest should be the 
primary consideration in decisions regarding the child, such as, parental responsibility for, 
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guardianship of or adoption of a child.220 An expert report focusing on the rights and legal 
status of children brought up in various forms of families found that the well-being of 
children in families depends also on the legal framework existing in each country: 
Children do not live in a vacuum, but within a family, and an important part of their protection is that 
the family unit, no matter what form it takes, enjoys adequate and equal legal recognition and 
protection. In other words, it is as discriminating to the child to limit legal parenthood, or to deny 
significant carers legal rights and responsibilities, as it is to accord the child a different status and 
legal rights according to the circumstances of their birth or upbringing.221 
Also an ILGA-Europe report on the rights of children raised in LGBT families noted: 
[…] it cannot be in the best interest of […] children to leave their important relationships of care 
outside of the legal framework of rights and responsibilities that are specifically designed to protect 
their interests simply on the basis of their parent’s sexual orientation or gender identity.222 
The biological parent-child relationship has always been protected under the 
Convention.223 Further,  the  Court  found  already  in  1999  that  the  sexual  orientation  of  a  
biological parent must not be a factor when deciding on the parental custody over a 
child.224 However, the child’s status in same-sex families and especially the relationship 
between the second-parent and the child is often left without any legal protection even 
when the relationship between the parents is protected. As Hodson notes, “differences 
between partnership laws and marriage laws are most likely to be found in the matters 
relating to children”.225 Even when a country allows same-sex marriage, the same-sex 
spouses’ access to parenthood (through inter alia adoption, surrogacy or AID) might be 
inferior to that of different-sex spouses.226 
4.3.2 Second-parent adoption 
Usually three different types of adoption are recognised: 1) Individual or single adoption 
when one person becomes adoptive parent alone. 2) Second-parent or step-parent adoption 
when one partner adopts the other partner’s biological or adopted child without terminating 
the first parents legal rights and thereby giving both of them legally recognised parental 
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status. 3) In joint adoption a couple adopts a child jointly.227 A single adoption and a joint 
adoption are usually aimed at creating a relationship with a child who is unrelated to the 
adopter(s), whereas second-parent adoption ”serves to confer rights vis-à-vis the child on 
the partner of one of the child’s parents”.228 Consequently, allowing second-parent 
adoption would be the best way to protect children already being raised in same-sex 
families. 
The first complaint that concerned second-parent adoption was Kerkhoven and Others v. 
the Netherlands (1989) which the Commission dismissed as manifestly ill-founded. The 
Commission noted among other things that the positive obligation under the Convention 
”does  not  go  so  far  as  to  require  that  a  woman […] living  together  with  the  mother  of  a  
child and the child itself, should be entitled to get parental rights over the child” and that 
”as regards parental authority over a child, a homosexual couple cannot be equated to a 
man and woman living together”.229 
The issue was not again raised again until Gas and Dubois v. France in 2012. The 
applicants were two women who had cohabited since 1989 and had, in 2002, entered into a 
civil partnership agreement (Pacte civil de solidarité,  PACS).  In  2000  Ms.  Dubois  had  
given birth to a child, conceived in Belgium through AID, and the child had lived all her 
life in the applicants’ shared home and been co-parented by both applicants. Ms. Gas had 
applied for a simple adoption in order to legally establish her parental responsibility over, 
and relationship with the child. However, her application was rejected on the grounds that 
second parent adoption was only available to married couples and in the applicants’ case it 
would have the effect that the legal relationship between the child and her biological 
mother would be severed contrary to their intentions. The applicants submitted that the 
reasons given for the refusal definitely ruled out adoption by same-sex couples because 
they were unable to marry under the French law. They complained that the refusal to grant 
them second-parent adoption violated their rights under articles 8 and 14.230 
The applicants further submitted that because of their sexual orientation their child was 
deprived of her right to a second legal parent. Whereas a child, conceived by AID, born to 
a cohabiting different-sex couple, would have the man automatically registered as the legal 
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father.231 The Court ruled that for the purposes of second-parent adoption, the applicants 
were not in a comparable situation to married different-sex couple, only for whom the 
second-parent adoption was possible, because of the differences between PACS and 
marriage. When compared to a different-sex couple in a PACS, there was no 
discrimination, because they would likewise have their application for second-parent 
adoption rejected. By finding that the applicants were not in an analogous situation 
compared to a married different-sex couple, the Court was able to avoid progressing to the 
fourth stage of article 14 analysis, namely considering whether there was an objective and 
reasonable justification for excluding unmarried same-sex couples from second parent 
adoption and whether such distinction was necessary in a democratic society to protect 
families based on marriage.232 
The fact that the applicants were legally unable to marry, unlike a different-sex couple in 
the same situation, was not important in the Court’s view. It  had already ruled in Schalk 
and Kopf that  article  12  did  not  impose  an  obligation  on  the  contracting  states  to  grant  
same-sex couples access to marriage and that providing any other means of recognition 
were within the state’s margin of appreciation.233 The commentator in the European 
Human Rights Law Review finds it disappointing, that the Court refuses to consider the 
indirect discrimination that the applicants clearly suffer and concentrate on the direct 
discrimination which does not exist because a PACS is not in analogous to a marriage.234 
Although  the  Court  is  supposed  to  place  ”clear  emphasis  on  the  social  rather  than  the  
biological reality of a situation”,235 this was not at all apparent in Gas and Dubois although 
‘social reality’ clearly proofed the existence of family ties. The existence of family life 
between the applicants, which was not disputed, should have led to a positive obligation 
imposed on the state to legally recognise the existing family ties. For instance, in the 
Marckx and Johnston and Others cases  the  respondent  state  was  required  to  legally  
recognise the bond between the child and her biological parent(s) in order to allow the 
persons concerned to lead a normal family life.236 The same should apply even in the 
                                               
231 Gas and Dubois v. France (2012), § 43. 
232 Johnson 2012a, 1142–1143. 
233 Gas and Dubois v. France (2012), §§ 62, 66–69. 
234 European Human Rights Law Review 2012, 445. 
235 Kilkelly 2003, 17. 
236 Marckx v. Belgium (1979), §§ 31, 45 
 48 
absence of biological ties especially as in Gas and Dubois where the child only had one 
legal parent. 
Further, Judges Spielman and Berro-Lefèvre observed in their concurring opinion that the 
fact that ”the applicants’ daughter can have a legal tie only with her mother […] does not 
appear to me to stand in the way of a normal family life”, especially where the delegation 
of  parental  responsibility  was  an  option  in  the  event  of  a  crisis.237 However, as Johnson 
note, this argument is rather unconvincing since they later acknowledged that the French 
provision challenged was problematic because the ”legal status of the child remains full of 
uncertainty, which is certainly not in the interest of the child”.238 
The best interest of the child is, in fact, totally absent from the Court’s reasoning in the 
case, as Judge Villiger points out in his dissenting opinion: 
Justifying discrimination in respect of the children by pointing out that marriage enjoys a particular 
status for those adults, who engage in it, is in my view insufficient in this balancing exercise […] In 
the best interest of the child born into a same-gender-relationship, I believe the child should be offered 
the best possible treatment afforded to other children born into a heterosexual relationship - which is 
joint parental custody.239 
Johnson further argues that the concurring opinion of Spielmann and Berro-Lefèvre 
explicitly shows that the sitting judges recognised that sexual orientation was the sole 
ground for a difference in treatment in Gas and Dubois,  but nevertheless failed to follow 
the Court’s own principle, established in Kozak v Poland that ”if the reasons advanced for 
a difference in treatment were based solely on the applicant’s sexual orientation, this 
would amount to discrimination under the Convention”.240 
Johnson proposes several political reasons for the Court’s decision in Gas and Dubois, 
such as, the criticism directed towards it and the drafting of the Brighton declaration by the 
United Kingdom, or the ongoing French presidential elections campaign. However, these 
reasons do not satisfy him but instead he states that the Court ”lacked ‘teeth’ to confront 
one of its most powerful contracting states” and continued its long-term tendency ”to 
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dismiss complaints from gay and lesbian applicants in respect of a wide range of social and 
civil rights”.241 
The latest judgment concerning second-parent adoption is X and Others v. Austria (2013). 
The applicants complained that the Austrian courts’ refusal to grant the co-parent the right 
to adopt the biological son of the other partner without severing the mother’s legal ties 
with the child amounted to discrimination under article 14 taken in conjunction with article 
8. This case differed from Gas and Dubois because the Austrian Civil Code allowed 
second-parent adoption for both married and unmarried couples. These provisions, 
however, were not applicable to same-sex couples because the second-parent adoption 
severed the parent-child relationship between the child and the parent who is of the same 
sex as the adoptive parent, therefore a second-parent adoption by the female partner of the 
child’s mother would sever the relationship between the child and the mother.242 
The existence of ‘family life’ between the applicants was not disputed.243 As to the alleged 
discrimination on ground of sexual orientation, the Court took the same approach as in 
cases E.B. v. France, Kozak v. Poland and P.B and J.S. v. Austria, that differences based 
on sexual orientation require particularly convincing and weighty reasons, and that 
differences based solely on considerations of sexual orientation are unacceptable under the 
Convention.244 The Court found the applicants to be in a relevantly similar situation 
compared to an unmarried different-sex couple to whom second-parent adoption was 
available, because it had “not been argued that a special legal status exists which would 
distinguish an unmarried heterosexual couple from a same-sex couple”.245 
Secondly, the Court observed that there had been difference of treatment between the 
applicants and an unmarried different-sex couple and that this difference was “inseparably 
linked to the fact that [they] formed a same-sex couple, and was thus based on their sexual 
orientation”.246 The Court paid particular attention to the fact that the Austrian courts had 
only relied on the legal impossibility of second-parent adoption in a same-sex couple as a 
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ground for dismissal; and had not examined the circumstances of the case in detail, for 
instance, such as whether the adoption was in the child’s best interest or whether there 
existed any conditions for overriding the biological father’s refusal to consent to the 
adoption. The Court noted that this would not have been the case, if the applicants were an 
unmarried different-sex couple, “then the domestic courts would not have been able to 
refuse the adoption request as a matter of principle”.247 
The Court, however, emphasised the fact that it was not ruling on whether the applicants’ 
adoption request should be granted, but whether ”the applicants were discriminated against 
on account of the fact that the courts had no opportunity to examine in any meaningful 
manner whether the requested adoption was in the [child’s] interest given that it was in any 
case legally impossible”.248 This meant that the applicants’ second-parent adoption request 
should have been examined in substance, as would have been a similar request from a 
different-sex couple in similar situation.249 
The government’s argumentation relied on the implied but unproven assumption that only 
a family with opposite-sex parents could adequately provide for a child’s needs. The Court 
noted, however, that Austrian legislation appeared to lack coherence: Adoption by one 
person, including one homosexual, was possible, and if this person had a registered partner 
the latter had to consent. Nevertheless, second-parent adoption was explicitly prohibited in 
the Registered Partnership Act. The Court observed that ”[t]he legislature therefore accepts 
that a child may grow up in a family based on same-sex couple, thus accepting that this is 
not detrimental to the child. Nevertheless, Austrian law insists that a child should not have 
too mothers or two fathers.”250 
Finally, the Court noted the importance of obtaining legal recognition and protection to 
existing de facto family life. Although the Court stated that ”de facto families based on 
same-sex couple exist but are refused the possibility of obtaining legal recognition and 
protection”.251 Its judgment still leaves most same-sex families in Europe without 
protection, the judgment only being applicable to situations where contracting states 
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authorise second-parent adoption for unmarried different-sex couples, which is four 
countries in addition to Austria.252 
There have been no complaints concerning joint adoption by same-sex couples in the 
Court. However, for example Portugal allows same-sex marriage but not joint adoption by 
a same-sex couple,253 and in Finland marriage and registered partnership are virtually equal 
except that same-sex couples are not allowed to adopt jointly.254 It would be very 
interesting to see what kind of conclusion the Court would reach in such situations. Would 
it apply the principles established in the case X and Others and Burden255 that when same-
sex couples are in comparable situation to different-sex couples difference in treatment is 
not allowed, which should be the case if same-sex marriage is allowed, or when registered 
partnership is nearly equal to marriage in its legal effects. 
4.3.3 Recording same-sex parents on a birth certificate 
The applicants in Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany (2013) were two women in a 
registered civil partnership. Following the birth of their son by AID, the local authorities 
issued a birth certificate where the second applicant was named as the mother and the 
space provided for the father’s name was left blank. The applicants requested that the first 
applicant’s name should be recorded on the birth certificate as the second parent, since in 
the case of married different-sex couple the father was the man who was married to the 
mother at the time of birth even though he was not the child’s biological parent. Second-
parent adoption was available to the applicants.256 
The applicants complained under article 8 on its own and taken in conjunction with article 
14. They submitted that there were no reasonable justifications for the differential 
treatment. The Court, however, concluded that the applicants were not in a similar 
situation to a married different-sex couple and dismissed the application as manifestly ill-
founded. The Court’s main argument was that the national law was based on the 
presumption that the man married to the mother at the time of birth was indeed the child’s 
biological father, and this principle was ”not called into question by the fact that this legal 
presumption might not always reflect the true descent”. On the other hand, in the case of a 
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same-sex couple, it could, with certainty, be ruled out on biological grounds that the child 
only descends from one of the partners. Therefore, there was ”no factual foundation for a 
legal presumption” that the child descends from the other partner as well. 257 
The Court also noted that it was not ”confronted with a case concerning transgender or 
surrogate parenthood”, which is important because if the father was a transsexual, the 
biological parenthood could also be ruled out but he still  could be registered on the birth 
certificate as the father. Therefore, the Court’s argument seems to lack coherence.258 
Moreover, the Court did not even consider that there are several European countries which 
allow the automatic co-parent recognition for same-sex registered partners.259 
It is noteworthy that the Court did not apply its own principle established in Burden 
regarding the comparability of marriage and civil partnership, but instead concentrated on 
the biological differences between different-sex and same-sex couples. This decision, 
according to Johnson, once again demonstrates ”the Court’s reluctance to address clear 
inconsistencies in laws that create discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation”.260 
4.4 Legal recognition in the context of individual rights 
For the purposes of this thesis, the legal recognition of same-sex family life does not only 
mean recognition by means of marriage or civil partnership legislation. Especially in the 
absence of such legislation it would be important that same-sex families are recognised at 
least in the context of various individual rights and benefits. 
Instead of challenging their exclusion from the institution of marriage, some same-sex 
couples have chosen to challenge sexual orientation discrimination in respect to individual 
rights or benefits that under national legislation are only available to different-sex couples. 
This was the case especially prior to Schalk and Kopf judgment.  The right to respect for 
private and family life have been claimed by same sex couples in relation to different 
economic benefits, such as housing, insurance, pension taxation and social security. 
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4.4.1 Housing 
Same-sex couples, or rather, surviving partners of same-sex couples, have been most 
successful in their claims challenging sexual orientation discrimination in respect of the 
right to succeed to the tenancy of the deceased partner. Probably because the Court has 
been able to review these cases under the right to respect for home and has thus avoided 
taking a stand on the issue of family life. 
In Röösli v. Germany (1996)  the  applicant  was  refused  succession  to  the  tenancy  of  his  
dead male partner. The German legislation of the time extended the tenancy succession 
rights to unmarried heterosexual couples living together as wife and husband but not to 
same-sex couples. The application was found inadmissible by the Commission and 
therefore never reached the Court. The Commission found that this difference in treatment 
was objectively and reasonably justified because “family, to which the relationship of 
heterosexual unmarried couples living together can be assimilated, merits special 
protection in society”, thereby accepting discrimination between unmarried different-sex 
and unmarried same-sex couples as justified. Furthermore, it observed that the question of 
proportionally between the means employed and the aim pursued did not even arise, “as 
the complaint was that the legislation in question did not apply to the surviving partner of a 
homosexual couple, but gave a benefit to the claims of certain persons (“family”) only”.261 
However, already in 2003, in Karner v. Austria, the Court upheld the applicant’s complaint 
concerning his inability to succeed to tenancy previously held by his deceased same-sex 
partner. It came to same conclusion in the subsequent case, Kozak v. Poland, in 2010. 
However, in both cases the Court deliberately sidestepped the question about ‘private life’ 
and ’family life’ and found that the applications fell within the scope of the applicants’ 
right to respect for their home.262 In these cases the Court established that ”the protection 
of the ‘traditional’ family is not an objective or reasonable justification for the blanket 
exclusion of same-sex partners from benefits available to different-sex partners”.263 
Further, in Kozak, the Court made explicit reference to the living instrument doctrine by 
stating that: 
[…] given that the Convention is a living instrument, to be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions, the State, in its choice of means designed to protect family and secure […] respect for 
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family life must necessarily take into account developments in society and changes in the perception 
of social, civil-status and relational issues, including the fact that there is not just one way or one 
choice in the sphere of leading and living one’s family or private life.264 
4.4.2 Economic benefits 
In Mata Estevez v. Spain (2001), the applicant complained that his ineligibility for a 
survivor’s pension after the death of his same-sex partner violated his rights under articles 
8 and 14. The Court dismissed the application as inadmissible. The Court first noted that 
the part where the applicant claimed interference with his ‘family life’ was materially 
incompatible, ratione materiae, with the Convention, since homosexual relationships did 
not fall within the scope of ’family life’. The Court accepted that the complaint related to 
the applicant’s ’private life’, and that he might have been treated differently if his partner 
had been of opposite sex. However, the Court observed that marriage constituted an 
essential precondition for eligibility for a survivor’s pension and that the Spanish 
legislation had a legitimate aim, namely protecting the family based on marriage. 
Consequently, the difference in treatment fell within the state’s margin of appreciation.265 
In Manenc v. France (2010), the Court came to a similar conclusion. The applicant had 
been refused access to a survivor’s pension after the death of his male partner with whom 
he had cohabited and entered into PACS. The Court concluded that because of the 
differences, especially regarding joint financial responsibilities, between marriage and 
PACS the applicant had not been in an analogous situation with a married different-sex 
couple. Since survivor’s pension was only available to a married spouse, the differential 
treatment was not based on the applicant’s sexual orientation because also different-sex 
couples  in  PACS  would  not  have  access  to  survivor’s  pension.  The  application  was  
dismissed as manifestly ill-founded.266 
Burden v. the United Kingdom (2008) did not concern a same-sex couple per se, but two 
cohabiting sisters who argued that they should be exempt from an inheritance tax as a 
survivor from marriage or a civil partnership would. The Court ruled that there had been 
no violation, but neither the outcome nor most part of the reasoning behind it, is relevant 
here. However, in this judgment the Court equated marriage and civil partnership: 
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[…] the Grand Chamber notes that it has already held that marriage confers a special status on those 
who enter into it. The exercise of the right to marry is protected by Article 12 of the Convention and 
gives rise to social, personal and legal consequences […] 
Since, the coming into force of the Civil Partnership Act in the United Kingdom, a homosexual couple 
also  has  the  choice  to  enter  into  a  legal  relationship  designed by Parliament  to  correspond as  far  as  
possible to marriage.  
As with marriage, the Grand Chamber considers that the legal consequences of civil partnership under 
the 2004 Act, which couples expressly and deliberately decide to incur, set these type of relationship 
apart from other forms of cohabitation. Rather than the length or the supportive nature of the 
relationship, what is determinative is the existence of a public undertaking, carrying with it a body of 
rights and obligations of a contractual nature. Just as there can be no analogy between married and 
Civil Partnership, on the one hand, and heterosexual or homosexual couples who choose to live 
together but not to become husband and wife or civil partners, on the other hand, the absence of such 
a legally binding agreement between the applicants renders their relationship of cohabitation, despite 
its long duration, fundamentally different to that of a married or civil partnership couple. This view is 
unaffected by the fact that […] member States have adopted a variety of different rules of succession 
as between survivors of a marriage, civil partnership and those in a close family relationship and have 
similarly adopted different policies as regards the grant of inheritance tax exemptions to the various 
categories of survivors […]267 
The Court’s statement in Burden was central in two subsequent complaints Courten v. the 
United Kingdom (2008) and M.W. v. the United Kingdom (2009). The applicant in Courten 
had been denied a tax exemption from inheritance tax after the death of his male partner of 
over 25 years, and the applicant in M.W. was excluded from a certain social security 
benefit after the death of his male partner. Both benefits were only available to a surviving 
spouse from different-sex marriage. Both applicants argued on basis of the Burden case 
that because at the time of death of their respective partners, the civil partnerships which 
later extended these rights to same-sex civil partners had not been available; thus they had 
not had the possibility of entering into a binding legal relationship.268 
In Courten the applicant argued further that it had been the element of choice which same-
sex couples did not have that “made it possible to compare and distinguish married 
heterosexual couples and civil partners and those who cohabited without a legally binding 
agreement.” The Court rejected the applicability of its Burden statement about the 
similarity of marriage and civil partnership between homosexual partners, because the 
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applicant and his deceased partner had not been in a civil partnership but in a long term yet 
still informal relationship. As to the applicant’s argument that his partner had died before 
the Civil Partnership Act was passed and therefore they had not had the ability to enter 
one, the Court merely stated that “in the area of evolving social rights where there is no 
established consensus, States must enjoy a margin of appreciation in the timing of the 
introduction of legislative changes”.269 
The applicant in M.W. submitted that “to deny the analogy [between cohabiting same-sex 
couple and married different-sex couple because the former did not have the possibility of 
legalising their relationship] gave rise to the curious situation that same-sex couples would 
not  be  able  to  complain  of  discrimination  under  Article  14  until  the  State  took  steps  to  
grant them equality of treatment with married couples by formally recognising 
relationships”. He argued further that ”it would be discriminatory to treat him in the same 
manner  as  the  survivor  of  an  unmarried  heterosexual  couple,  given  the  significant  
differences between these situations”.270 
However, according to the Court, the government could not be criticised for not having 
introduced civil partnerships any earlier than it did. The Court also noted, that there is 
nothing to suggest that at the relevant moment there would have been a sufficient 
consensus among the contracting states on the formal recognition of same-sex relationships 
”that would have significantly narrowed the United Kingdom’s margin of appreciation in 
this respect”.271 
Nor can the enactment of the Civil Partnership Act be taken as an admission by the domestic 
authorities that the non-recognition of same-sex couples, and their consequent exclusion from many 
rights and benefits available to married couples, was incompatible with the Convention. Instead, by 
acting as they did and when they did the United Kingdom authorities remained within their margin of 
appreciation. Moreover, the comprehensive manner in which the Act ensures equal entitlements for 
same-sex couples who enter into a civil partnership means that, although it was not in the vanguard, 
the United Kingdom is certainly part of the emerging European consensus described by the third party 
interveners.272 
The Court dismissed both Courten and M.W. complaints as manifestly ill-founded. 
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In P.B. and J.S. v. Austria (2010) a cohabiting same-sex couple claimed to be victims of 
discrimination because of the impossibility to have the cover of the second applicant’s 
health and accident insurance, which he enjoyed as a civil servant, extended to include the 
first  applicant.  According  to  the  national  legislation  such  an  extension  was  only  open  to  
married or cohabiting different-sex couples. 
The Court found that the applicants enjoyed ’family life’ and that although the Convention 
did not guarantee a right to insurance cover per se, when the state had gone beyond its 
obligations under article 8 and created such a right, it must not discriminate in the 
application of that right. The government failed to give any sufficient justifications for the 
differential treatment between unmarried different-sex and same-sex couples. Accordingly, 
there had been a breach of article 14 taken in conjunction with article 8.273 It is noteworthy 
that the Court found that the discrimination had started already in 1997 when the 
applicants had initiated the national proceedings and afforded the applicants damage from 
that day onwards. This is remarkable since at the material time the Court did not even 
recognise the analogy between unmarried different-sex and same-sex couples.274 
The applicant in J.M. v. the United Kingdom (2010) was a divorced mother of two children 
who lived mostly with their father. She was living with a female partner in a ”close, loving 
and monogamous relationship characterised by long-term sexual intimacy” in a house they 
owned jointly.275 As the non-resident parent, she was required to pay child maintenance 
and thus contribute financially to the costs of her children’s upbringing. According to the 
national legislation applicable at that time, the amount of the maintenance payment was 
reduced when the absent parent had entered into a new relationship, married or unmarried, 
but it took no account on same-sex couples. The applicant complained of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation under article 14 taken in conjunction with article 8 and article 1 
of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1, protection of property). It is noteworthy that the applicant’s 
complaint  was  upheld  by  three  domestic  courts  but  finally  overturned  in  the  House  of  
Lords.276 
As such, the judgment does not provide anything new compared to previous judgments. 
The Court did not even consider the complaint under article 8 because the issue fell within 
                                               
273 P. B. and J. S. v. Austria (2010), §§ 30, 34. 
274 Röösli v. Germany (1996). 
275 J.M. v. the United Kingdom (2010), § 5. 
276 J.M. v. the United Kingdom (2010), §§ 1–19; ECtHR 2014a, 12. 
 58 
the scope of P1-1. The Court found that there had not been reasonable justifications for the 
differential treatment which was based solely on the applicant’s sexual orientation. The 
violation had existed even before the enactment of the Civil Partnership Act which later 
remedied the situation.277 
4.4.3 Immigration and family reunification 
Currently, a significant gap in the Court’s case law concerning same-sex families remains 
in the sphere of immigration law. The first complaints in the 1980‘s claiming same-sex 
family life concerned immigration regime in the United Kingdom.278 In all of these cases, 
the applicants complained that that the refusal by immigration authorities to allow them to 
remain in the United Kingdom on the basis of their same-sex relationships violated their 
rights under articles 8 and 14. The Commission found all these complaints inadmissible 
and as there have not been any new complaints regarding this issue since the 1980‘s, the 
Court has not yet had a change to examine such complaint. 
Taking into account the Court’s current view that same-sex couples are in a comparable 
situation to unmarried different-sex couples and that differential treatment between them 
requires convincing and weighty justifications, the Court would most likely apply the same 
principle to immigration law that differentiates between unmarried same-sex and different-
sex couples. However, as Johnson notes, the absence of any case law on the issue leaves 
the situation uncertain.279 The situation might change in few years since there is currently 
one same-sex immigration case pending at the Court.280 
4.4.4 Employment pension – A short detour into European Union law 
For the most part, especially for the sake of limited space, European Union law has been 
excluded from this thesis. However, the European Union and the Council of Europe and 
thereby also the Court are becoming increasingly interconnected. The European Union 
Charter of Fundamental Rights refers to the Convention as setting the minimum standard 
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of human rights protection in the EU,281 the Court has referred to the Charter in its case 
law,282 and the EU is currently preparing for its accession to the Convention.283 
I shall here shortly present two judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(ECJ) concerning sexual orientation discrimination under the EU law. My aim is to 
illustrate how the issue has been addressed by the ECJ and to be able to consider later 
whether the Court might learn something from the ECJ’s approach. However, it is 
important to note the different character of the EU law and that it is not entirely 
comparable to the Convention system. While the Convention system comprises one 
Convention drafted over 60 year ago, the EU law consists, in addition to its primary 
legislation (the Union Treaties), of ever-growing number of secondary law drafted and 
passed by the EU legislative bodies. The EU member states have also surrendered some of 
their sovereign rights to the EU and have bestowed on it powers to act independently.284 
The ECJ is ”the highest and […] sole judicial authority in matters of Union Law”.285 
In Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen (VddB) (2008), the 
defendant was a pension scheme for employees of German theatres. The applicant, Mr 
Maruko, was denied survivor’s pension after the death of his registered partner because 
such benefit was, according to the VddB’s statutes, only available to married partners. The 
ECJ ruled in the applicant’s favour and stated that the treatment amounted to a direct 
discrimination to the degree that registered couple can be said to be in a comparable 
situation to a married couple.286 
In Maruko the ECJ also established a principle that Wintemute calls ”obligation of 
consistency”.  The  ECJ  ruled  that  it  was  up  to  Germany  to  decide  whether  to  have  a  
registered partnership law for same-sex couples and how many rights to grant to them. 
However, once Germany voluntary decided to pass a registered partnership law and to put 
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registered partners to a comparable situation with a married couple, it could not exclude 
them from rights that fell within the scope of EU anti-discrimination law.287 
The subsequent case, Jürgen Römer v. Frey und Hansestadt Hamburg (2011), concerned 
the applicant, Mr Römer, who had a registered partner and received lower retirement 
pension than other former employees of the city of Hamburg who were married. The ECJ 
ruled that even if marriage and family law legislation remains in the competence of the EU 
member states, when ”a Member State excludes same-sex couples from marriage, 
employment benefits must not be restricted to married couples”.288  
The ECJ further specified its ‘individual-specific comparison‘ test by ruling that the 
criteria must be comparable, and not identical, situations, and that the comparison has to be 
”specific and concrete” instead of ”global and abstract”.289 This meant that the comparison 
had to be made between people and not as an overall comparison between marriage and 
registered partnership as abstract institutions.290 The ECJ also stated that the ”goal of the 
protection of marriage and the family in a national constitution as such is not a valid 
justification for discrimination, as Union law supersedes also national constitutional law”, 
however, the ECJ emphasised that this is the case only if the discrimination complained 
falls within the scope of EU law.291 
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5. THE LIMITS OF THE COURT’S SUPERVISION 
5.1 The Court’s role 
The Court operates in a European-wide context where it has to accommodate 47 different 
national systems.292 Therefore, the Court’s role as a supranational human rights court 
distinguishes it significantly from highest courts in other jurisdictions in inter alia United 
States, Canada and South Africa, where courts have ruled the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from marriage to be unconstitutional.293 
According to the article 32 of the Convention, ”[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall extend 
to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention”. However, 
the Court’s competence is not limited only to enforcing obligations that are explicitly or 
implicitly stated in the Convention or in its drafting documents (travaux préparatoires). 
The Court has held in numerous occasions that it also has the ”power to update” the 
Convention rights.294 As Mahoney notes ”[t]he special nature of the [Convention] compels 
a flexible and evolutive interpretation of its open-textured terms if the Convention is not to 
become progressively ineffective with time”.295 
According to Uoti, the Court cannot extend its interpretation so far that it risks loosing the 
support of the contracting states. He points out that since the Court lacks any real coercive 
measures, its authority and the compliance with its judgements are therefore ultimately 
dependent on the goodwill of the contracting states. Consequently, it is important for the 
fulfilment of the rights of individuals that the Court does not overstep its legitimacy.296 
During its existence the Court has attracted criticism for both overstepping its role as well 
as not fulfilling it, or in other words, for being too active and introducing new rights that 
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originally were not intended to be part of the Convention,297 and for being too conservative 
and using the margin of appreciation doctrine to avoid tackling with sensitive or 
controversial issues.298 Since the issue of legal recognition of same-sex family life still 
remains sensitive and controversial in many countries around Europe, it is relevant to ask 
here, in the end of this thesis, what are the limits of the Court’s human rights supervision 
and what should be the Court’s role in promoting the rights of same-sex couples. 
5.2 Judicial activism v. judicial self-restraint 
The concepts of ‘judicial activism’ and ‘judicial self-restraint’ derive from the American 
judicial discourse, but have also been used in the context of the ECtHR. Judicial activism 
exists when ”judges [modify] the law from what it  previously was or was stated to be in 
the existing legal sources, often thereby substituting their decision for that of elected 
representative bodies”,299 whereas judicial self-restraint means that ”judges should avoid 
transgressing beyond their traditional roles as interpreters of the law”.300 However, given 
the nature of the Convention provisions, the Court needs a certain amount of creativity 
when interpreting it.301 
It can be said that for the most part, the Court is judicially active.302 On many occasions it 
has interpreted the Convention in a way that has certainly gone beyond what the drafters 
intended and thereby significantly raised the level protection of human rights in Europe. 
For example, the scope of ’access to Court’ in Golder v. the United Kingdom, positive 
obligations in Marckx v. Belgium and the negative freedom of association in Young, James 
and Webster v. United Kingdom being part of article 11 despite the deliberate omission 
from the Convention by the drafters, just to identify a few. 
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5.3 The Court’s case-by-case approach 
One very central feature of the Court’s jurisprudence is its case-by-case approach.303 The 
Court stated in the already mentioned freedom of association case Young, James and 
Webster that ”in proceedings originating in an individual application, it has, without losing 
sight of the general context, to confine its attention as far as possible to the issues raised by 
the concrete case before it”.304 
The Court’s case-by-case approach is greatly contributed by the Convention rules on the 
admissibility, i.e., the way applications are brought to the Court and which applications the 
Court  is  qualified to examine.  The Court  supervision limits to those cases that fulfil  the 
Convention admissibility criteria that require, inter alia, that the applicant must be a victim 
of a concrete human rights violation. Accordingly, the Court cannot initiate proceedings by 
itself nor will it consider actio popularis complaints or complaints in abstracto.305 
The Court’s examination of the merits of each case is ”concrete rather than abstract and 
focuses on the individual rights violation in question rather than on the general compability 
of  a  legal  situation  with  the  Convention”.  This  results  in  a  “flexible  and  highly  
individualised jurisprudence, which clearly offers individuals relief and which enables the 
Court to send a message to both the states and their citizens that individual fundamental 
rights really matter”.306 
On the other hand, the case-by-case approach might also result in gaps in the Court’s 
jurisprudence as it only concentrates on the specific facts of each case. For instance in 
Schalk and Kopf, the Court noted the substantial differences regarding parental rights 
between marriage and registered partnership but it was ”not called upon in the present case 
to examine each and every one of these differences in detail”.307 It would have to address 
one of those difference in a subsequent case that specifically concerned discrimination in 
respect of parental rights.308 
However, as both Gerards and Kuijer note, the case-by-case approach does not necessarily 
reflect the whole truth, but in reality, the Court pays quite a lot attention to coherence and 
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consistency in its case law.309 For instance in Ireland v. the United Kingdom (1978) the 
Court stated that its ”judgments in fact serve not only to decide those cases brought before 
the Court,  but more generally,  to elucidate,  safeguard and develop the rules instituted by 
the Convention”.310 Later it observed in Karner that: 
”[a]lthough the primary purpose of the Convention system is to provide individual relief, its mission is 
also to determine issues on public-policy ground in the common interest, thereby, raising the general 
standards of protection of human rights and extending human rights jurisprudence throughout the 
community of Convention states”311 
Further, the establishment of the Grand Chamber also indicates the Court’s growing 
awareness of the problems in the case-by-case approach and the increasing significance 
precedent has in its case law. The Grand Chamber is principally asked to decide cases 
which raise difficult interpretative questions, disclose legal inconsistencies, or touch upon 
national or political sensitivities.312 
5.4 Precedent v. evolutive interpretation 
Several commentators agree that the doctrine of stare decisis, i.e., that judges are bound by 
the precedent, does not apply in the Court system, but that the Court generally follows its 
own precedent.313 Mowbray identifies three different justifications the Court have offered 
in order to warrant departure from its precedent: ”uncertainty in the existing 
jurisprudence”, ”rapidly increasing number of complaints to the Court” in a specific 
matter, and the application of the living instrument doctrine, i.e., evolutive interpretation. 
However, he also notes that the Court often avoids expressly stating that it is overruling 
precedent. 314 
According to Mowbray, it is currently ”primarily up to the parties to an application or the 
Court itself to raise the issue as to whether a precedent should be overruled. Campaigning 
organisations may be able to play a secondary role in advocating change in the 
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jurisprudence by seeking the Court’s permission to submit third-party comments on the 
matter in a relevant case”.315 
Next, the application of the living instrument doctrine as a justification for departing 
precedent will be examined in more detail. When considering issues such as same-sex 
family rights, where the developments across Europe occur in a rapid pace but unevenly, 
the Court is often faced with the question whether it should follow its previous case law or 
to adopt an evolutive approach. The evolutive interpretation aims to ensure that ”the 
Convention is interpreted in a manner that reflects contemporary standards”.316 The 
contemporary standards are generally determined through a consensus analysis where an 
evolved European standard or sometimes a clear international trend justifies subsequent 
upgrading of the Convention standards.317 Consequently, a lack of European consensus 
usually  results  in  the  Court  following  its  precedent.  In  the  context  of  precedent  versus  
evolutive interpretation, the Court has stated that: 
While the Court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, in the interests of legal 
certainty and foreseeability it should not depart, without good reason, from its own precedents. It is of 
crucial importance that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its rights 
practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. A failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and 
evolutive approach would indeed risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement.318 
When assessing the role of its precedence in a case at hand, the Court first takes notice 
whether the current case is distinguishable on its facts from the previous case. Secondly, 
the Court considers whether there are any cogent reasons for departing the previous case 
law.319 Therefore, where the previous case and the current case are indistinguishable on 
their judicially relevant facts, the Court should follow its precedent unless there are 
compelling reasons for departing it. Such reasons may exist when the Court identifies, for 
instance, ”changing conditions”, ”scientific and societal developments”, ”societal change” 
or ”evolving convergence as to the standards to be achieved”. Where any such changes or 
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developments can be detected, the Court must revise its interpretation. A failure to do so 
would jeopardise the practical and effective human rights protection in Europe.320 
5.5  The erga omnes effect of the Court’s judgments on LGBT rights 
Erga omnes effect indicates a situation where the influence of a international court’s 
judgment extends beyond the applicant and the respondent state in a particular case, for 
example when a judgment against one contracting state trigger policy or legal changes in 
other contracting states.321 In their recently published article Helfer & Voeten have 
demonstrated this by using the Court’s case law on LGBT rights as an example.322 Their 
empirical study shows that the Court’s judgment against one country increases the 
likelihood that other countries will adopt the same pro-LGBT reforms in policy or 
legislation. Furthermore, they find that the Court’s rulings have the greatest marginal effect 
in countries where public acceptance of LGBT rights is low. Their findings also indicate 
that the Court does not aggressively push countries to reform, but nevertheless applies a 
kind of ”majoritarian activism” meaning that it usually recognises LGBT rights claims 
when at least a simple majority of contracting states have already done so.323 
According to Waaldijk, the legislative developments in LGBT rights in Europe have 
tended to follow a standard sequence where decriminalisation of homosexual activity is 
followed by anti-discrimination provisions and finally by partnership legislation.324 His 
analysis suggests that that each step paves way for the next and that the previous step is 
required before a country can progress to the next stage. Accordingly, those countries that 
first enacted registered partnership legislation and eventually equal marriage were among 
the first countries to decriminalise homosexual activity and to provide anti-discrimination 
provisions prohibiting sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination.325 
Waaldijk’s standard sequence can also be detected in the Court’s jurisprudence on LGBT 
rights. In the beginning of 1990’s the Court gave its last ruling in decriminalisation of 
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homosexual activity, since then the applications have mainly centred around different 
antidiscrimination issues, among others, minimum age of sexual consent, freedom of 
expression, freedom of assembly and hate speech. Currently, the focus is slowly shifting 
towards partnership rights.  
The findings of Waaldijk and Helfer & Voeten combined suggest that the Court has been 
instrumental in pushing contracting states forward to the next stage of development. 
Especially since both Council of Europe and European Union have used the Convention 
standards in LGBT rights as criteria for new accession countries.326 
5.6 The Court as a part of European-wide human rights regime 
The results of Helfer & Voeten support the argument that the Court, while not being in the 
vanguard of LGBT rights, has nevertheless had a major role in bringing about pro-LGBT 
reforms throughout Council of Europe member states. Thus, reinforcing the conclusion 
that the Court mostly remains judicially active. This added with the Court’s authority and 
status as well as the binding nature of its judgments, makes the Court an appealing forum 
not only for applicants but also for LGBT rights advocates to challenge the prevailing 
discrimination. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that the Court is not a fast lane 
for passing pro-LGBT reforms and it can take years before the Court reaches a judgment. 
However, the Convention’s first and foremost purpose was not to be used by the Court to 
find violations and to scrutinise contracting states. It was created to provide the Council of 
Europe member states a framework for achieving greater unity and higher human rights 
standards through policy and legislation. Hence ideally, the contracting states should 
comply with the Convention standards by themselves, and the Court should be the final 
remedy in protecting human rights in Europe and be resorted to only when national 
remedies fail. 
Furthermore, the Court does not operate in a vacuum but Europe is almost buzzing with 
human rights bodies and organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, and 
they all have a role to play. Other official European-wide human rights bodies such as 
Council of Europe, the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, the Fundamental Rights 
Agency of the European Union, and even the institutions of the European Union such as 
                                               
326 Helfer & Voeten 2014, 90. 
 68 
the European Parliament have been much more outspoken about the same-sex families’ 
need for legal recognition.327 
For instance the European Parliament only recently called for the Commission and all EU 
member states to more effectively enforce the Free Movement Directive without 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation328 and the Council of Europe Committee of 
Ministers recommended in 2010 that: 
Where national legislation does not recognise nor confer rights or obligations on registered same-sex 
partnerships and unmarried couples, member states are invited to consider the possibility of providing, 
without discrimination of any kind, including against different sex couples, same-sex couples with 
legal or other means to address the practical problems related to the social reality in which they 
live.329 
To  sum  up,  it  will  be  the  continuing  interaction  and  cooperation  of  all  these  bodies  and  
organisations and not the Court alone that will guarantee the best results for same-sex 
families on a pan-European level as well as in the individual countries. Although, the 
Court certainly has a special role in ensuring that all the contracting states comply with the 
overall progress and if necessary issue a legally binding kick in the butt. 
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6. SUMMARISING THE MAIN FINDINGS AND SOME CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
6.1 Recalling the purpose of this study 
The purpose of this thesis was to study the Court’s jurisprudence on same-sex families and 
to examine how the Court has met their need for legal recognition and protection. I had 
formulated this purpose into two research questions: 
1) How the Court has recognised and protected same-sex family life and what is the 
current level of protection afforded to them? 
2) Has the Court been consistent in its case law and is the protection afforded 
satisfactory? 
In this chapter, these questions will be answered and, in addition, I shall identify main 
problems in the Court’s current approach, consider possible explanations for the current 
situation as well as suggest some ways forward. 
6.2 Results of the case law analysis 
6.2.1 How has the Court recognised and protected same-sex family life? 
Looking back, the developments in same-sex family rights have happened in relatively 
rapid pace especially during the past ten years. The first complaints by same-sex couples 
claiming right to family life and access to rights and benefits available to different-sex 
couples, were lodged in 1980’s. During the 1980’s and the 1990’s none of the same-sex 
family life complaints reached the Court, but the Commission dismissed all as manifestly 
ill-founded. The first such complaint was found admissible in the beginning of 2000, and 
in 2003 the Court, for the first time, found a situation where same-sex couples were 
excluded from a right that was available to unmarried different-sex couples to violate 
article 14 taken in conjunction with article 8. 
On  the  basis  of  the  case  law  analysis  in  chapter  4,  two  major  turning  points  can  be  
identified in the Court’s jurisprudence regarding same-sex family rights. The first would be 
Karner v. Austria which was the above mentioned first successful complaint concerning 
discrimination against same-sex couples. In that case the Court established that protection 
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of the traditional marriage does not justify exclusion of same-sex couples from rights 
afforded to unmarried different-sex couples. However, the Court was able to circumvent 
the question of ‘family life’ by examining the complaint under the ‘home’ limb of article 
8.330 It is important to note that in 1996, only seven years before the Karner judgment, the 
Commission still had regarded discrimination between unmarried different-sex and same-
sex couples as acceptable under the Convention.331 
The second turning point would be Schalk and Kopf where, although not finding a 
violation, the Court extended the definition of ‘family life’ to cover the relationship 
between a same-sex couple. Schalk and Kopf also marks a shift in the Court’s 
jurisprudence to more favourable treatment of same-sex families. Since Schalk and Kopf, 
the Court has found a larger portion of applications by same-sex couples admissible than 
ever before.332 In its subsequent judgments, such as X and Others, P.B. and J.S. and 
Vallianatos and Others, the Court has systematically applied the principle that differential 
treatment based on sexual orientation requires ”particularly convincing and weighty 
reasons by way of justification” and that in such cases the state’s margin of appreciation is 
narrow.333 
The Court seems to also have followed the standard sequence of LGBT rights reforms.334 It 
has already ruled extensively on decriminalisation and discrimination against 
homosexuals, among others, in age of consent legislation and in armed forces.335 The 
Court is also currently shifting towards partnership rights which can be seen in the 
increasing amount of complaints regarding same-sex family rights. This is supported by 
the fact that Schalk and Kopf also seems to have marked a change in the nature of the 
complaints concerning same-sex family rights lodged with the Court. Prior to Schalk and 
Kopf, all applicants complained of discrimination in respect to specific rights and benefits, 
inter alia, housing, pension and insurance. After Schalk and Kopf, applicants are 
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increasingly challenging the absence of partnership legislation that would allow same-sex 
couples to legalise their relationship. 
6.2.2 What is the current level of protection afforded 
From the case law analysis, certain trends can be detected and the Court’s current position 
on same-sex family life can be summarised as follows: “no recognition unless unmarried 
different-sex couples are recognised”.336 
The Court currently accepts that unmarried different-sex and same-sex couples are in an 
analogous situation and should be treated equally. Therefore, the Court will most likely 
find a violation of article 14 taken in conjunction with article 8 in situations where there is 
differential treatment between unmarried different-sex and same-sex couples, and where 
the respondent state is unable to provide convincing justification for the discrimination.337 
It is significant that the Court has found the prohibition of such discrimination to extend 
retroactively as far back as a concrete discrimination can be shown to have taken place, 
despite the fact that at the material time such discrimination would have been accepted.338 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Court  still  accepts  the  protection  of  the  traditional  family  as  a  
weighty and legitimate reason for maintaining the special status of marriage and excluding 
same-sex families from the rights and benefits available to marital families. Therefore, the 
Court will most likely not find a violation in cases where same-sex couples allege 
discrimination compared to married couples. This outcome is not affected by the fact that it 
is legally impossible for same-sex couples to marry or contract civil partnership and 
thereby gain access to the rights and benefits available to marital families. 
Furthermore,  it  is  not  possible  for  same-sex  couples  to  challenge  their  exclusion  from  
marriage under any combination of the relevant articles. The Court has stated unanimously 
several times that the Convention does not impose an obligation on the contracting states 
to grant same-sex couples access to marriage, nor is there an obligation to provide same-
sex couples any alternative means of legal recognition. If a state chooses to do so, it enjoys 
a certain margin of appreciation as to the exact status conferred. Consequently, the Court 
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will not define a minimum standard for rights to be included in civil union legislation but 
this is left to the discretion of contracting states.339 
It is noteworthy that while the prohibition of discrimination between unmarried differed-
sex couples and same-sex couples applies retroactively, that is not the case when it comes 
to discrimination between married couples and civil partners. It is entirely up to 
contracting states to decide when they want to enact civil partnership legislation, and the 
Court will not reproach them for not introducing such legislation earlier. Accordingly, 
although a state currently provides civil partnership legislation for same-sex couples, they, 
nevertheless, cannot complain of discrimination between married different-sex couples and 
unmarried same-sex couples that occurred before the entry into force of the civil 
partnership legislation.340 
Although, in Burden the Court paralleled marriage and civil partnership in cases where a 
state has made them comparable in their scope of rights and obligations. However, the 
Court’s recent judgment in Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel suggest that the Court is still 
willing to accept discrimination between married couples and civil partners. On the other 
hand, it would be very interesting to see what the Court would decide in situations where a 
state have authorised same-sex marriage but continues to exclude married same-sex 
couples from rights available to married different-sex couples, such as assisted 
reproduction services in France341 or joint and second-parent adoption in Portugal.342 
6.2.3 Has the Court been consistent in its case law and is the protection afforded 
satisfactory? 
My second research question was whether the Court has been consistent in its case law 
regarding same-sex family life and whether the current level of protection afforded is 
satisfactory. I chose to include this question because the Court is often being accused of 
being inconsistent and arbitrary when it comes to same-sex family rights and also to LGBT 
rights in general. The consistency/satisfaction binary in the question was deliberate, 
because being consistent means ’conformity in the application of something’ whereas 
satisfactory means ’the meeting or fulfilment of expectations, standards, or requirements’ 
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therefore one may be consistent in one’s actions yet the outcome of the actions may be 
unsatisfactory.343 
My answer for the first question is indefinite. On the one hand, the Court has, since Karner 
in 2003, consistently held that discrimination between unmarried different-sex and same-
sex couples is not justified but that it is within a state’s margin of appreciation to maintain 
the special status of marriage without providing same-sex couples an alternative means of 
recognition. Accordingly, complaints concerning discrimination between married 
different-sex couples and unmarried same-sex couples, such as, Courten, Manenc and 
M.W. have been found inadmissible, whereas the Court has found a violation in cases 
where same-sex couples where discriminated in comparison to unmarried different-sex 
couples in cases X and Others, P.B. and J.S., J.M., and Vallianatos and Others. 
On the other hand, the Court treats same-sex families differently in different contracting 
states;  the  status  of  same-sex  families  being  dependent  on  the  level  of  protection  an  
individual state affords to unmarried different-sex couples. Consequently, the Court has 
ruled that same-sex couples should have the right to second-parent adoption in Austria but 
not in France; and same-sex couples same-sex couples should have the right to contract a 
civil union in Greece but not in some other country that does not offer any alternative 
institutions to marriage. Therefore, one can argue that the Court is inconsistent in  its  
treatment of individual same-sex couples while being consistent when it comes to abstract 
issues. 
As to the second question whether the current level of protection is satisfactory? I began 
this thesis with the premise that same-sex families are capable of the same love and 
commitment as different-sex families and therefore deserve the same level of protection. 
Currently, they are not afforded the same level of protection and therefore my answer for 
this question is negative. The situation will remain unsatisfactory until the same level of 
protection is reached. 
6.3 Further analysis 
6.3.1 Main problems in the Court’s current approach to discrimination 
Finally, I shall present some of the main problems in the Court’s current approach. I shall 
first identify the major problems in the way the Court approaches discrimination between 
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married different-sex couples and unmarried same-sex couples, and after that highlight 
some other aspects of the Court’s case law on same-sex family life. 
The Court is not taking the discrimination seriously.344 The Court has, in numerous 
occasions, emphasised that “differences based solely on considerations of sexual 
orientation are unacceptable under the Convention”, and that such differences require 
“particularly convincing and weighty reasons” to be justified”.345 However, by refusing to 
address the indirect discrimination same-sex couples suffer when they are excluded from 
marriage, the Court fails to apply the strict scrutiny it has promised to all sexual orientation 
complaints. Instead, it grants the states a wide margin of appreciation to determine by 
themselves whether such difference of treatment is justified.346 
Absence of objective and reasonable justifications: By rejecting the analogous situation 
between same-sex couples and married different-sex couples, the Court avoids progressing 
to  the  fourth  and  final  stage  of  article  14  test  which  would  involve  an  analysis  of  the  
proportionality of the alleged discrimination.347  Consequently,  the  Court  has  never  
considered whether there are any objective and reasonable justifications for excluding 
same-sex couples from the rights available to married couples. 
The absence of any justifications is also linked to the way margin of appreciation is used in 
these cases. As the dissenting judges in Schalk and Kopf argue: 
[…] in the absence of any cogent reasons offered by the respondent Government to justify the 
difference of treatment, there should be no room to apply the margin of appreciation. Consequently, 
the  “existence or non-existence of common ground between the laws of the Contracting States” is 
irrelevant as such considerations are only a subordinate basis for the application of the concept of the 
margin of appreciation. […] it is only in the event that the national authorities offer grounds for 
justification that the Court can be satisfied, taking into account the presence or the absence of a 
common approach, that they are better placed than it to deal effectively with the matter.348 
Absence of the best interest of the child perspective: In cases concerning parental rights 
and second-parent adoption, the Court focuses exclusively on the relationship between the 
parents and whether they are in a comparable situation to different-sex parents, thus, 
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ultimately circling back to the same approach it has when children are not involved. 
Therefore, the same principle “no recognition unless unmarried different-sex couples are 
recognised” applies. This leaves a great number of children raised in same-sex families 
without protection in most part of Europe that only afford protection to marital families. 
Furthermore, the Court has not addressed the situation directly from the child’s perspective 
and specified the appropriate actions for the member states to guarantee the compliance 
with the best interest of the child under the ECHR and under the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.349 
Separate but equal: By stating that it is within the contracting states’ margin of 
appreciation to decide what kind of legal recognition they want to offer to same-sex 
couples. The Court is ultimately contributing to the creation of ‘separate but equal’ 
partnership regulation regime in Europe. However, it has been established over and over 
again that “separate is not equal”, not when concerns race and not when it concerns sexual 
orientation, even if same-sex couples had access to all of the rights of marriage but under 
another name.350 
The Court’s approach through the prohibition of discrimination is problematic in general. 
The core issue in all the analysed cases were whether same-sex couples were discriminated 
against when compared to a different-sex couple in similar situation. While this might be 
the best way for the Court to approach the problems that result from the lack of legal 
recognition of same-sex families, such approach also gives rise to a presumption that 
same-sex families are only recognised in reference to different-sex families. As though 
they do not have any inherent value of their own and are not subjects worthy of protection 
by themselves but only when compared to different-sex families. Same-sex families should 
have rights by the virtue of the fact that they are families by their own right, not because 
they just resemble the hegemonic different-sex family. 
Uneven protection: Furthermore, the Court’s “no recognition unless unmarried different-
sex couples are recognised” principle also results in uneven protection around Europe. It 
can also produce paradoxical effects by allowing the Court to punish those states that 
already have recognised more rights while not affecting those that do not recognise any 
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rights at all.351 For instance the majority of same-sex family life complaints have been 
brought against the United Kingdom, France and Austria. They are currently in places 1, 5 
and 13 respectively, in the ILGA-Europe Rainbow Map 2013. While the Court’s 
judgments have, no doubt, had a positive effect on the LGBT rights development in these 
countries, there are a great number of other countries that could certainly need the Court’s 
attention more.352 
6.3.2 Main problems in the Court’s approach – some additional aspects 
Positive obligation under article 8: The Court has often held that the effective respect of 
‘family life’ requires the contracting states to act affirmatively to ensure normal enjoyment 
of ‘family life’. The positive obligation may even include providing legal recognition for 
family ties. However, the Court has not been consistent in its application of positive 
obligations when it comes to same-sex families. As dissenting judges in Schalk and Kopf 
argued,  as  soon  as  the  Court  held  that  a  same-sex  relationship  falls  within  the  notion  of  
‘family life’, it should have drawn interferences from this finding and deduced a “positive 
obligation to provide a satisfactory framework, offering the applicants, at least to certain 
extent, the protection any family should enjoy”.353 
Interpretation principles: One of the Court’s most important interpretation principles is 
that “the Convention is a living instrument, to be interpreted in present-day conditions”. 
However, to reach the conclusion that the Convention does not obligate the contracting 
states to allow same-sex marriage, the Court did not apply the living-instrument doctrine 
but resorted to the ordinary meaning of words and the historical context of the Convention. 
The Court  concluded that the deliberate choice of wording (‘men and women’ instead of 
‘everyone’ or ‘no one’) and the fact that Convention was drafted in the 1950’s when 
marriage was “clearly understood in the traditional sense of being a union between partners 
of  different  sex”,  had  to  mean  that  article  12  only  applies  to  different-sex  couples.354 
However, the Court has, numerous times, expressly departed from the drafters’ intention 
and ruled that keeping the Convention safeguards ‘real and effective’ requires evolutive 
reading of the Convention. Moreover, it would have been impossible for the drafters to 
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foresee the emergence of LGBT rights in the mainstream European agenda. Therefore, in 
the context of same-sex family rights, use of the living instrument doctrine would be of 
particular importance in order to make the Convention guarantees practical and effective. 
Tradition: Finally, a major problem lies in the way the Court embraces the ‘traditional’ 
concepts of marriage and family without any critical assessment of the concepts. The Court 
accepts that the protection marriage and family in the traditional sense is a weighty and 
legitimate reason to justify the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage. 355 However 
the Court does not engage in any critical examination of how these ‘traditional’ concepts 
“are used to justify the preservation of the heteronormative social construction of 
marriage”.356 Moreover,  “tradition  on  its  own  cannot  be  a  sufficient  justification  for  a  
difference in treatment”.357 If it was, women would still be without the vote and racial and 
ethnic discrimination would be accepted and enforced by the governments themselves. 
In contrast, the tradition argument has been critically inspected by several courts in other 
jurisdictions which have ruled on same-sex marriage. For instance one U.S. court observed 
that: 
“[t]o define the institution of marriage by the characteristics of those to whom it always has been 
accessible, in order to justify the exclusion of those to whom it never has been accessible, is 
conclusory and bypasses the core question we are asked to decide” 358 
Role of European consensus: European consensus is another way the Court incorporates 
the tradition argument in its rulings on same-sex family rights. The Court’s statement that 
there is not yet European consensus regarding the legal recognition of same-sex family life 
could also be read that the ‘tradition’ to discriminate same-sex couples still prevails in 
Europe. Consequently, the same counterargument applies, the fact that majority of 
European countries think that some form of discrimination is permissible, and still enforce 
it through law and policy, does not constitute a sufficient justification. It is unreasonable 
that the Court requires European consensus before it can rule discriminatory treatment to 
be in violation of the Convention. It is clearly wrong that one group of people is excluded 
from the most elementary protection of family life only because majority of contracting 
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states accept this. To remedy these kinds of situations is one of the very reasons the 
Convention was drafted in the first place. 
6.3.3 Possible explanations for the current approach 
Especially on basis of the most recent judgments concerning same-sex family life, it seems 
that the Court already has all the pieces in the puzzle to make the protection of same-sex 
family life ‘real and effective’ under the Convention. The Court has stated very clearly that 
”differences based solely on considerations of sexual orientation are unacceptable under 
the Convention” and that ”where a difference in treatment is based on […] sexual 
orientation the State’s margin of appreciation is narrow”.359 It has also recognised the 
importance of legal recognition of same-sex families by the states,360 and that the right to 
marry under article 12 must not necessarily be limited to different-sex couples.361 
Therefore,  the  question  remains:  why is  the  Court  not  willing  to  go  further  and  rule  that  
positive obligation under article 8 and the right to marry also extend to legal recognition of 
same-sex family life. Evidently, the Court does no longer object to same-sex family rights 
and as it still did in the 1990s. Accordingly, its current approach to same-sex family rights 
cannot be explained by its reluctance to admit that same-sex families are essentially the 
same as different-sex families, as regards to their capability of love and commitment as 
well as their need for legal recognition, because it is not true, the Court clearly accepts this. 
Hence, reasons for the Court’s unwillingness to address the discrimination between same-
sex couples and married different-sex couples have to be looked for elsewhere. 
It is, of course, impossible to find a definite explanation for the Court’s current position. 
However, one possible explanation seems to be the Court’s role as a supranational court. 
The Court’s need to maintain its legitimacy and the support of the contracting states could 
explain why it is not advocating same-sex family rights more actively when it clearly 
recognises the major problems in their situation and their need for same legal protection as 
all  the other families.  This argument is  supported by the Court’s statement in Schalk and 
Kopf that ”it must not rush to substitute its own judgement in place of that of the national 
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authorities, who are best placed to assess and respond to the needs of society”.362 This is 
also what Wintemute suggests: 
Is this consensus-based approach a strength or a weakness of the court? Although I found it frustrating 
at  first,  I  consider  it  a  strength.  The  court  looks  for  consensus  because  its  judgments  are  binding.  
When it takes a stand on a particular human rights issue, it expects 47 European countries to follow, 
sooner or later. Expulsion from the Council of Europe is the ultimate sanction for failure to comply 
with a judgment of the court. If the court appeared to force the views of a small minority of countries 
on all 47, it would risk a political backlash, which could cause some governments to threaten to leave 
the convention system. As a result, the ability of the court to assist, with regard to a particular issue in 
a particular country, depends on the state of "European consensus".363 
6.4 Ways forward 
To conclude, I shall offer some suggestions for what the Court could do in order to 
enhance the protection of same-sex families under the Convention. Obviously, this is not 
just a strategy for the Court. It is advisable that the contracting states should adopt these 
measure on their own initiative. 
The Court should consider examining the next complaint concerning the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from marriage under article 14 taken in conjunction with article 12 as the 
issue falls within the ambit of the right to marry. Through this approach the Court should 
focus on the reasons why the minority, same-sex couples, has been excluded from the 
opportunity that is provided to the majority.364 
In this respect the Court could start by concluding that since same-sex couples are in a 
similar situation to different-sex couples as regards their need for legal recognition. 
Accordingly, the Court should conclude that they are in analogous situation also for the 
purposes of article 14. In justifying this, the ECJ’s approach in comparing individuals and 
not abstract institutions could be useful. After establishing the comparability between 
same-sex and different-sex couples, the respondent states should be required to provide 
justifications for the exclusion same-sex couples from marriage. Sometimes just “publicly 
setting out the reasons in writing” may have a positive effect in LGBT rights advocacy in 
national policy making and legislation.365 However, the Court should also be critical of the 
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reasons offered for justification especially since stigmatisation and segregation through 
law are not legitimate aims of the government under the Convention.366 
The next step would be to extent the positive obligation under article 8 to cover same-sex 
families and to require legal recognition of their family life to ensure the effective 
enjoyment  of  their  right  to  family  life.  At  minimum,  this  would  require  enacting  some  
form of registered partnership legislation. Although, the Court should be extremely careful 
not to advocate a ‘separate but equal’ family regulation regime, this step could be used as a 
transitional period especially for those countries that currently do not offer any kind of 
legal protection to same-sex families. 
Moreover, the Court should be especially discouraging against differences in parental 
rights. As it is currently a major problem that even countries which are enacting ‘equal’ 
marriage legislation make same-sex spouses’ parental rights and access to parenthood 
inferior to those of different-sex spouses. Since the child’s best interest should be of utmost 
importance in all matters involving children, the Court should apply stricter scrutiny than 
in cases concerning consenting adults. It is a fact that children are raised in same-sex 
families across Europe. Affording the states a wide margin of appreciation as regards the 
legal recognition of these children’s “important relationships of care” is certainly not in 
their best interest.367 
Alternatively, instead of requiring the legal recognition of same-sex couples, the Court 
could require that even if the states are not ready to enact civil partnership regulation, the 
status of children and their right to two legal parents should be equalised. There is certainly 
enough scientific and sociological evidence to rebut any lack of European consensus as to 
the uncertainty of the possible consequences in growing up in a same-sex family. 
Another step further, the Court could consider adopting an ‘obligation of consistency’ 
approach similar to the ECJ. Accordingly, the Court should, in the name of consistency, 
impose higher standards upon those contracting states that have voluntarily created a legal 
framework for same-sex families. This approach would also counter the formation and the 
persistence of a ‘separate but equal’ regime. This would also ensure that the progress of 
same-sex family rights is not stagnated in the more advanced countries because some other 
countries hinder the formation of European consensus. 
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Naturally, the obvious final step would be defining marriage a human right that should be 
accessible both different-sex and same-sex couples without discrimination. It is, of course, 
unlikely that the Court will come to this conclusion in the near future, but it could already 
start signalling in its judgments that it will not tolerate the exclusion of same-sex couples 
from marriage indefinitely. The Court could already now explicitly state that “same-sex 
couples have the right to marriage equality” but that it will not fully implement this 
principle until European consensus supports it.368 
Such an approach would shift the locus of the Court’s scrutiny from whether same-sex 
couples should have right to legal recognition of their family life, to how and when they 
should have this right, thereby better reflecting the Court’s current position.369 This 
strategy would also contribute to the transparency of the Court’s approach in this matter by 
clarifying its position on the subject matter and clearly indicating why it currently cannot 
proceed any further. It would also be important to start the process towards marriage 
equality as soon as possible, given the fact that the Court cannot self decide when it has the 
change to examine complaints concerning same-sex marriage. 
Finally, when European consensus has been reached, the Court should rule that same-sex 
couples have the right to marry on equal basis with different-sex couples. 
On a final note. During the writing of this thesis, I tried hard to understand and accept why 
the Court is proceeding cautiously in this matter. In the end, when balancing between the 
same-sex  families’  right  to  dignity  and  to  equal  protection  under  the  law,  and  the  
contracting states’ right to cling to a fantasy of the ‘traditional’ family in the 21st century, 
there is no doubt in my mind which way the scale should tip. 
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